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ABSTRACT 
In this recent time, the importance of cybersecurity and cyber defense is sky-high. Everyone 
uses different devices, IT infrastructures, and applications for various purposes at school, 
office, home, hospitals everywhere. With the enlightenment of technology, the nature of 
cyber-attack has been changed dramatically, and that is why the number of cyber-attacks 
have been increased. Enterprises face billions of Euros loss from such incidents; even the 
data loss and operational hazard may have a devastating impact not only on the service, 
security, privacy, brand image but also upon overall business. A constrictive and realistic 
CSCD (cyber security and cyber defense) strategy along with the proper implementation of 
it, can safeguard the enterprises and strongly from cyber attacks. In this paper, we prepare 
an improved CSCD control framework based on several hundreds of scientific papers and 
frameworks. Moreover, we identify different aspects and strategic elements by holistic CSCD 
control risk assessment and data analysis for preparing CSCD strategy and planning of 














1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Background and Problem Identification ........................................................... 12 
1.2 Problem Justification ........................................................................................ 13 
1.3 Research Question ........................................................................................... 14 
1.4 Study Objectives .............................................................................................. 14 
1.5 Study Relevance and Importance ..................................................................... 15 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................... 17 
2.1 Strategic elements for Cyber Security and Cyber Defense: .............................. 17 
2.1.1 Variants of Cyber Attack ........................................................................... 17 
2.1.2 Recent Cyber Threats ............................................................................... 18 
2.1.3 Business Centric Strategic Elements ......................................................... 19 
2.1.4 Cyber Security and Cyber Defense  (CSCD) Governance ............................ 19 
2.1.5 Cyber Security and Defense Intelligence: .................................................. 21 
2.1.6 Strategic Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) : ................................................. 22 
2.2 Cyber defense model strategic approach: ........................................................ 23 
2.3 Cyber Security Strategic Pillars: ........................................................................ 26 
3. Conceptual Research Model .................................................................................. 28 
4. Research Methodology: ......................................................................................... 30 
5. CSCD Control FramEwork For Strategic Guideline and Planning ............................. 33 
5.1 Assumption ..................................................................................................... 33 
5.2 Study and analyze major Cybersecurity and Cyber Defense Framework and  ...... 
 scientific research papers ................................................................................ 34 
5.3 CSCD Control Framework Concept .................................................................. 36 
5.4 CSCD Control Framework Fundamental .......................................................... 37 
5.5 Framework Implementation ............................................................................ 38 
5.5.1 CSCD Governance ..................................................................................... 40 
5.6 CSCD Framework Component ......................................................................... 41 
5.6.1 CSCD Control Criteria ............................................................................... 42 
5.6.1.5 CSCD Framework Function: ................................................................ 45 
5.7 CSCD Control Baseline ...................................................................................... 57 
5.7.1. Security Strategy and Planning Control Family ......................................... 57 
5.7.2 Policy, Business Continuity, and compliance ............................................. 58 
7 
 
5.7.3. Hardware Asset Management ................................................................. 59 
5.7.4. Software Asset Management ................................................................... 61 
5.7.5. Vulnerability Management ...................................................................... 63 
5.7.6. Privileged Accounts Management ............................................................ 65 
5.7.7. Identity, Access, and Authentication Management .................................. 67 
5.7.8. Configuration Management (Hardware, Software, Mobile device, ...............  
laptop, Workstation, servers, IoT, etc.) .............................................................. 72 
5.7.9. Maintenance, Monitoring, and Log Management .................................... 73 
5.7.10. Email, Browser, and Web Protections .................................................... 75 
5.7.11. Malware Defense Management ............................................................. 76 
5.7.12. Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services .......... 78 
5.7.13. Network Device Security (Firewall, Routers, Switch and etc.) ................. 79 
5.7.14. Network Defense ................................................................................... 80 
5.7.15. Wireless Access Control ......................................................................... 83 
5.7.16. Data Protection, Recovery, and Backup ................................................. 84 
5.7.17. Application Software Security ................................................................ 86 
5.7.18. Risk Assessment and Management ........................................................ 88 
5.7.19. Incident Response and Management ..................................................... 89 
5.7.20. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises ............................................ 90 
5.7.21. Security Awareness and Training ........................................................... 91 
5.7.22. External Service Management ............................................................... 92 
5.8 Risk level Landscape based on RMM Level ....................................................... 93 
5.8.1. Risk Level Landscape for Micro to Small Enterprise .................................. 94 
5.8.2. Risk Level Landscape for Small to Medium Enterprise .............................. 94 
5.8.3. Risk Level Landscape for Medium to Large Enterprise .............................. 95 
5.8.4. Risk Level Landscape for Large to Super Large Enterprise ........................ 95 
5.9. Overall Risk Landscape all types of Enterprises Based on Risk Score: ............... 96 
5.10. CSCD High Risk Parent Control Family landscape based on RMM Level: ........ 97 
5.11. Diversity of Sophistication Level on RMM Level Enterprise ............................ 98 
6.0 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................100 
6.1  Synthesis of the research ...............................................................................100 
6.2 Limitations of the Work ...................................................................................101 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Different variants of Cyber Attacks (Stiawan et al., 2017). ...................................... 18 
Figure 2: Kill chain model for cybersecurity and defense (Hutchins et al., 2011) ................... 21 
Figure 3: Cyber capability defense model  (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). ................................ 24 
Figure 4: Cyber capability passive defense model (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) ...................... 24 
Figure 5: Cyber capability active defense model  (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) ....................... 25 
Figure 6: Cyber capability collaborative defense model (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) ............. 25 
Figure 7: Cyber capability defense actors (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) ................................... 26 
Figure 8: Research Methodology Overview .......................................................................... 31 
Figure 9: IDEAL model elaboration (Poore, 2006). ................................................................ 39 
Figure 10: IDEAL model framework implementation (Poore, 2006). ..................................... 39 
Figure 11: CSCD governance level (Gashgari et al., 2017). ..................................................... 41 
Figure 12: Roles, Activities, and Relationships interaction for CSCD governance  .................. 41 
Figure 13: NIST cybersecurity framework function (Barrett, 2018). ....................................... 45 
Figure 14: Risk assessment within risk management process (NIST, 2011). ........................... 49 
Figure 15: Organization-wide risk management (Kelley, 2014). ............................................ 50 
Figure 16: Information security model, the CIA triad (Al-Far et al., 2019) .............................. 53 
Figure 17: RL Landscape (Micro to Small)  ............................................................................. 94 
Figure 18: RL Illustration (Micro to Small) ............................................................................. 94 
Figure 19: RL Landscape (Small to Medium)  ......................................................................... 95 
Figure 20: RL Illustration (Small to Medium) ......................................................................... 95 
Figure 21: RL Landscape (Medium to Large) ......................................................................... 95 
Figure 22: RL Illustration (Medium to Large) ......................................................................... 95 
Figure 23: RL Landscape (Large to Super Large)  ................................................................... 96 
Figure 24: RL Illustration (Large to Super Large) .................................................................... 96 
Figure 25: Risk Score Landscape of parent controls based on RMM Level ............................. 97 
Figure 26: CSCD High Risk Parent Control Family landscape based on RMM Level ................ 98 
Figure 27: Sophistication level on micro to small ..................................................................98  
Figure 28: Sophistication level on Small to Medium .............................................................. 98 
Figure 29: Sophistication level on Medium to large .............................................................. 99 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Conceptual model of research ................................................................................. 28 
Table 2: Analized framework and research papers................................................................ 36 
Table 3: CSCD Parent Control Family .................................................................................... 43 
Table 4: IT Asset Type ........................................................................................................... 45 
Table 5: CSCD control sophistication level (Union & For, 2016). ............................................ 47 
Table 6: CSCD Risk Management maturity Level enterprise category .................................... 48 
Table 7: CSCD Risk Tolerance Level ....................................................................................... 51 
Table 8: Process of measuring impact and likelihood ............................................................ 52 
Table 9: Impact and likelihood score calculation ................................................................... 52 
Table 10: CSCD Impact criteria (CSA, 2019) (Cronin, 2018), (Thayer et al., 2013) .................. 56 
Table 11: Likelihood criteria (CSA, 2019) (Cronin, 2018) (Thayer et al., 2013) ....................... 57 
Table 12: Security Strategy and Planning Control Family ...................................................... 58 
Table 13: Policy, Business Continuity, and compliance .......................................................... 59 
Table 14: Hardware Asset Management ............................................................................... 61 
Table 15: Software Asset Management ................................................................................ 63 
Table 16: Vulnerability Management .................................................................................... 65 
Table 17: Identity, Access, and Authentication Management ............................................... 71 
Table 18: Configuration Management .................................................................................. 73 
Table 19: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Log Management .................................................. 75 
Table 20: Email, Browser, and Web Protections ................................................................... 76 
Table 21: Malware Defense Management ............................................................................ 78 
Table 22: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services ......................... 79 
Table 23: Network Device Security (Firewall, Routers, Switch and etc.) ................................ 80 
Table 24: Network Defense .................................................................................................. 83 
Table 25: Wireless Access Control ........................................................................................ 84 
Table 26: Data Protection, Recovery, and Backup ................................................................. 86 
Table 27: Application Software Security control ................................................................... 88 
Table 28: Risk Assessment and Management ....................................................................... 89 
Table 29: Incident Response and Management control ........................................................ 90 
Table 30: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises control ................................................ 91 
Table 31: Security Awareness and Training ........................................................................... 92 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
BOT Build Operator Transfer 
C2  Command and Control 
CD Cyber Defense 
CMA  Cyber Maturity Assessment 
CNA Computer Network Attack 
CNE Computer network espionage 
CRM  Customer Relationship Management 
CSCD    Cyber Security and Cyber Defense 
CTI Cyber Threat intelligence  
DDos Distributed Denial of Service 
ERP  Enterprise Resource planning  
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation 
IoT  Internet of Things 
ITSP  Information Technology Strategic Plan  
NDA  Non Disclosing Agreement 
RMM   Risk Management Maturity 
OT  Operational Technology 
SEMR  Smart Medical Devices and Electronic Medical Records  
RL Risk Level 














 Botnet:  A botnet is a number of Internet-connected devices, each of which is running 
one or more bots. Botnets can be used to perform Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attacks, steal data, send spam, and allow the attacker to access the device and its 
connection. 
 Defense-in-depth: Defense in depth is a concept used in Information security in which 
multiple layers of security controls (defense) are placed throughout an information 
technology (IT) system. Its intent is to provide redundancy in the event a security 
control fails or a vulnerability is exploited that can cover aspects 
of personnel, procedural, technical and physical security for the duration of the system's 
life cycle. 
 Dos/DDos: In computing, a denial-of-service attack is a cyber-attack in which the 
perpetrator seeks to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended 
users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the 
Internet.  
 Key logger: Keystroke logging software is one of the oldest forms of malware, dating 
back to typewriters. It's still popular and often used as part of larger cyber-attacks. 
 Patch/Patching: A patch is a set of changes to a computer program or its supporting data 
designed to update, fix, or improve it. This includes fixing security vulnerabilities and 
other bugs, with such patches usually being called bug fixes or bug fixes.  
 Whitelisting: Whitelisting (also referred to as allow-listing) is the practice of explicitly 
allowing some identified entities access to a particular privilege, service, mobility, access 





Cyber security is the development, management, and use of information security, OT security, and IT 
security tools and techniques for achieving regulatory compliance, defending assets, and 
compromising the assets of adversaries of the organization. On the other hand, Cyber defense is a 
computer network defense mechanism that includes a response to actions and critical infrastructure 
protection and information assurance for organizations, government entities, and other possible 
networks. Nevertheless, Cyberdefense focuses on preventing, detecting, and providing timely 
responses to attacks or threats so that no infrastructure or information has been tampered with. 
With the growth in volume and the complexity of cyberattacks, cyber defense is essential for most 
entities to protect sensitive data and safeguard assets. Cyber defense provides the much-needed 
assurance to run the processes and activities, free from worries about threats. It helps in enhancing 
the security strategy utilizations and resources in the most influential fashion. The cyber defense also 
helps in improving the effectiveness of the security resources and security expenses, especially in 
critical locations of enterprises (Galinec et al., 2017). Well-defined cyber security and cyber defense 
plan can improve cyber resilience and business growth. 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Cybersecurity control is an essential tool for any organization that seeks to protect its customers, 
employees, and corporate information. Defining the current and future state of a cybersecurity 
landscape provides clarity and assurance about cybersecurity that senior executives crave. A cyber 
security plan also enables IT to communicate effectively about how cybersecurity capability is 
positioned within an organization (Silva et al., 2018). 
 
While enterprises strive to improve information system security by investing in different 
technologies, the increasing sophistication of information systems attacks has also resulted in the 
need for joint information-sharing endeavors. A significant difficulty for firms defending against 
advanced information security attacks is the time gap between the attack and corresponsive 
response. This can be incredibly long when the firm has no previous knowledge of the kind of attack 
they face. A proper Cybersecurity defense plan with guidelines, equipment (software, hardware), and 
skilled resource can resist the potential attack. That is why organizations prepare a strategy based 
upon current trends, existent threats, IT systems type, resources, and cost, which minimize impact 
after a breach occurs.    
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1.2 PROBLEM JUSTIFICATION 
Many companies do not seriously prepare IT strategy and plan, especially in cybersecurity, through 
its importance for further growth of the company. Proper strategy and well-planned IT security 
systems can save money and not only maintain cyber resilience but also keeping an immense 
contribution to the development of business and future expansion. For example, medium / large 
organizations can suffer if they fail to design the dynamic architecture of the network, storage, and 
software for keeping up IT service alive. As most of the large European companies use versatile 
software like ERP, CRM, etc., UI design and software & data security could be vital for growth and 
decision-making. Even unauthorized access can consider a significant security threat. Proper 
alignment of business processes with information technology systems can hamper operation, 
productivity, and incise cost. In the bigger picture, it may cost permanent damage to brand 
reputation, which deteriorates the value and company share.  
 
That is why the impact of a failed Cybersecurity strategy is much higher for any business because it 
associates with risk, cost, and value. To get protection from future cyber threats, strategies can be 
developed to fill the gap between current and planned. As all the medium/large enterprise uses IT 
and services widely for running their business, strategic IT security planning is also considered part of 
business strategy to achieve bigger objective and excellency with adequately informed decision to 
invest in Information systems and security.  
  
An Information Technology Strategic Plan (ITSP) aims at discovering the resources and IT in an 
organization to direct the technological and information architecture to its strategic objectives 
(Stiawan et al., 2017). The first step to creating an effective IT strategic plan is to start with reviewing 
the organization's strategic plan, which helps identify the areas where the use of technology can 
improve operations (Roy, 2016). In recent years, with the improvement of economic sustainability, 
large companies are encouraged to move to cloud platforms. Despite easy operation and 
maintenance, there is a considerable risk exist in IT and Information Systems Cybersecurity. After the 
Covid-19 pandemic crisis, many companies have to reduce costs and migrate the number of 
applications or systems in cloud platforms to reduce the budget. As the diversity and depth of cyber-
attacks have been changing, tech leaders must gear up for next-generation AI-driven cyber-attack on 
IT infrastructure. When companies start exploring multi-cloud platforms, then security concerns will 
be severe on multiple platforms. Companies need to think about it and make a strategic plan for 




Data protection would be the next challenge for large enterprises. Most of the companies already 
implemented privacy designs based upon GDPR standards to meet ongoing concerns. Still, in many IT 
fields, data protection is not working correctly, especially in IoT devices using vulnerable architecture 
and software components. It will be challenging for organizations not to have a proper plan to deal 
with such a situation. Many companies use IoT devices and are not still aware of planning 
importance. My third point would be fulfilling the gap. Companies cannot rely on fresh graduates to 
meet the required diversity. To achieve a higher level of productivity, companies need to focus on 
adequate tanning, environment and evaluate the experience.  
 
The next problem is that many companies face making proper decisions regarding transformation. 
According to Gartner's analysis, about two-thirds of business leaders need to speed up digital 
transformation to their companies to save grounds from the competitors. In this way, automate 
business processes can boost productivity. Apart from that, organizations have to face several risks 
and deal accordingly. Sometimes, they have to prepare for uncertain risks to manage by a proper 
contingency plan. Moreover, lack of IT funding, IT organizational development, data management, 
enterprise application integration/upgrades, choosing the right technology or tools for business 
needs, etc., are the prime aspect that the company's top management and executive body need to 
focus on planning.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
My study is focused on identifying significant issues of Cybersecurity and choosing the right 
technology for assuring a company’s security and growth. After analyzing scientific paper and CSCD 
control framework data, I will identify top risky controls that will play a vital role in defining CSCD 
strategy to defend against cyber-attack. In addition, reviewed CSCD framework will give a 
constructive guideline for the different levels of enterprises to improve cybersecurity. Research 
questions are given below: 
 What are the strategic elements for Cybersecurity and Cyber Defense control 
framework? 
 How can CSCD risk assessment for inactive control contribute defining CSCD strategy, 
planning, and maintaining cyber resilience for the enterprises? 
1.4 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The research objective is to propose a CSCD strategic control framework and identify top 




 Study the current trend of Cyber Risks, Governance, and aspects of new strategical 
cybersecurity defense planning.  
 Study the cybersecurity & cyber defense control Framework. 
 Present CSCD Control Framework based on analyzed scientific research papers, previous 
best practices, and frameworks.  
 Present top risky CSCD control and sophistication level diversity based on RMM level. 
1.5 STUDY RELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCE 
Cybersecurity is now considered an essential part of individuals to organizations and educational 
institutions to all kind of financial institutions. Families and parents need to protect their children and 
family members from online fraud. In terms of financial security, it is crucial to secure our financial 
information that can affect our personal financial status (Kumar, 2015). Gone are the days of simple 
firewalls and antivirus software being your sole security measures. Business leaders can no longer 
leave information security to cybersecurity professionals. GDPR and other laws mean that 
cybersecurity is no longer something businesses of any size can ignore. Security incidents regularly 
affect businesses of all sizes and often make the front page causing irreversible reputational damage 
to the companies involved  (Aspa, 2017).  
 
For all of the responses mentioned above require a strategy and planning to protect against threats 
and cyber-attack. Medium and large enterprises have much concern about security and data 
confidentiality. Apart from that, the primary cybersecurity threats and trends are Phishing, 
Ransomware attacks, Cryptojacking, Cyber-Physical Attacks, State-Sponsored Attacks, IoT Attacks, 
Salami attacks, security vulnerability on Smart Medical Devices and Electronic Medical Records 
(SEMR), attacks by the third party, attack in a driverless car, social engineering, unauthorized access, 
etc. After analyzing the number of scientific papers, I realized that there are relatively fewer papers 
are exsisted to guide multi-level organizations for defining CSCD strategy and planing for maintaining 
cyber hygiene. Hence, a result of a comprehensive risk assessment to identify inactive controls risk 
have not been done in other scientific paper. My research drives these enterprises to take a strategic 
plan based on future cyber-attack and safeguard their information systems. By my research, different 
types of organizations and sectors like the energy sector, health, IT, research laboratory, financial 
organization, SME, telecom sector, space technology, etc., will be benefited to create a positive 
impact in a safe IT or cybersecurity environment.  
 
Moreover, my research will develop some scientific benchmarks and approaches of the cybersecurity 
control framework for different types of organizations based on their risk management maturity 
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level. In the future, researchers can get direction from my analysis. Nevertheless, top managers or C-
level executives (CTO, CIO, CISO, CEO, etc.) can get a compact guideline within a framework control 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nowadays, organizations like banks, telecom, or IT service providers face many cybersecurity threats 
to carry on their day-to-day business operations. To defend and safeguard IT systems from new 
cyber-attack, enterprises need a cyber-defense strategy.  To prepare the right plan and action in this 
regard, we must understand the respective IT infrastructure, strategic elements, governance 
framework of the company. Basically, a cyber-security strategy would be a combination of preventive 
measures and preemptive action of the security incident or breach. Cyber-security is both a strategy 
and operational framework, a field of operational capacity, an element of cross-disciplinary and 
trans-disciplinary approach that is fit to all levels of socio-political, economic, engineering, IT, legal, 
and security-led levels of theoretical approach and practicability uses and issues (Efthymiopoulos, 
2019). For financial and customer-oriented businesses cyber defense strategy would consider as a 
business defense strategy that mainly relies on cybersecurity and cyber defense policy for 
maintaining security resilience. 
2.1  STRATEGIC ELEMENTS FOR CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER DEFENSE: 
To prepare a cybersecurity strategical approach and governance framework, it is crucial to be aware 
of the strategic elements for cybersecurity and defense. A proper strategy can be made if it covers all 
the necessary aspects of this domain. To prepare strategic criteria to implement and governance 
strategies, the elementary understanding needs to clear. In this fast pacing world, the structure, 
nature, and technology have been changed dramatically. Making all balancing together a combined 
strategic element view can help choose the right approach for the enterprises.  
2.1.1 Variants of Cyber Attack 
At first, we need to know the most common variant of cyber-attacks. According to this paper 
(Stiawan et al., 2017) most common cyber-attacks, including their type and attack process in the 
following Figure 1: Different variants of Cyber Attacks. Here Trojan and Malware attack through 
web servers to website. They manipulate the system and get unauthorized access using a virus and 
hamper the usual activity of the website. Key logger, Dos/DDos, botnet, phishing are the most 
common approaches to do attack. On the other side, different kinds of Trojan and Malware can 
attack through mail server users. It appears mainly through an email body, an attachment, or an URL 
with a virus that can access the user email box even to the entire device. Another type of attack is 
SQL injection. This is a malicious code injection technique that can access a database and manipulate 
it. Because of website or Database defect, Database structure fault or improper privilege can 
increase the chance of this attack.  
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Apart from that, web phishing, password guessing (Brute Fore, Directory attack, Hybrid attack), Dos 
are the common and very effective forms of attack. These mentioned techniques can massively 
attack any organization. It will cost financially for the enterprises, and reputation, trust, and brand 
value will be demolished. 
                    
Figure 2: Different variants of Cyber Attacks (Stiawan et al., 2017). 
 
Based upon the targeted nature, hackers attack using mentioned attack mechanism to highly 
important systems. If an enterprise can identify potential attack criteria, it can identify risk and plan 
to protect its critical systems. That would be helpful to prioritize the security requirements and 
investment for a constructive strategical approach.  
2.1.2 Recent Cyber Threats 
Awareness about the current trend of cyber threats is the critical element for making a strategy. 
Every year, new types of threats pop up, and most of the time, enterprises do not get adequate time 
to respond and identify the attack. Some authors sorted out the pattern of new cyber threats that 
need to be considered for making safeguard policy.  
 
According to Forbes, about 83 percent of enterprise workload will be on the cloud by 2020. Some 
cloud services increase the threats will be increased gradually, which will be considered Cloud 
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vulnerability. Unauthorized access, control plane attaches, Data breach, Migration module attack, 
insecure interfaces and APIs, and misconfiguration are among the top cloud security threats needed 
to consider making cybersecurity strategy (Majhi & Dhal, 2016). 
 
AI-Enhanced Cyber threats are increasing these days. AI and machine learning have enormous 
capability to attack any kind of system with a high accuracy rate successfully. AI also can be used to 
safeguard and identify criminals. Apart from that, AI Fuzzing, Machine Learning Poisoning, Smart 
Contract Hacking, Social Engineering Attacks, Deep fake are the new trends of cyber-attack. (Caldwell 
et al., 2020). 
2.1.3 Business Centric Strategic Elements 
An organization needs to know its IT asset first to prepare a cyber-security and Cyber Defense 
strategy. Then the running service and process need to know as they may be interrupted after a 
cyber-attack. Here critical can be sorted out according to the sensitivity. Enterprises can identify their 
systems/services and data according to their business criticality for operational activity. Moreover, 
having a clear idea and action about Employees, contractors, third parties, and customers can give a 
broader view to make a proper strategy for them. Knowing the in-depth IT capability is essential. 
Without adequate infrastructure, software, and skilled IT resources, it would be challenging to assure 
Cybersecurity. Increase vigilance can improve the chances of stopping the incoming attack. That is 
why vigilance capability would consider a key for a company. If the Cyber Security and vigilance 
capability are ensured, it would be much easier for the enterprises to keep resilience in their 
Cybersecurity (KPMG, 2019). 
2.1.4 Cyber Security and Cyber Defense  (CSCD) Governance 
Cyber Security and Defense Governance are responsibilities and defined practices that direct the 
control to determine who is authorized to do what activity in terms of Cyber Security and Defensive 
operation to protect the organization’s assets. Cybersecurity governance refers to the component of 
enterprise governance that addresses the enterprise’s dependence on cyberspace in the presence of 
adversaries (Bodeau et al., 2010). Cybersecurity governance thus encompasses information systems 
security governance; whether information systems security governance can be identified with 
information security governance depends upon how narrowly or broadly the enterprise construes 
information security (Arunkumar et al., 2013). 
 
To maintain cybersecurity resilience, there is no other option to strengthen good governance. In this 
paper (Pernice, 2018), researchers also point out that good cybersecurity governance can prepare 
organizations to defend against potential cyber-attack. For this reason, a strategy and a suitable 
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model are necessary to prepare according to the nature of the business objective, innovation, vision, 
and goals. A strong cybersecurity strategy can achieve a competitive advantage by managing risk, 
facilitating operational excellence, increasing brand reputation, technology/system integrity. To 
develop an efficient Cybersecurity operating model, Senior or top management of the organization 
needs to assess current risk, existing assets, strength, managing domain, and capability. Cyber 
Maturity Assessment (CMA) can provide an illustrative view of the maturity of Cybersecurity and 
Defense capability. CMA Enables us to understand enterprise management about vulnerability, 
identify and prioritize areas for remediation and demonstrate corporate and operational compliance 
that turns information risk into a business advantage (KPMG, 2019). 
 
Most of the IT and cybersecurity-related strategies will be similar in different organizations upon the 
technology variant. Governing Cybersecurity activity is not kind of the process to do once in a time. It 
could be a systematic and repetitive process that can be vital for the entire security aspect. People 
are critical elements to mediate relations and provide support, communication, and technology-
related applications and services. Unauthorized and irresponsible human activity can be a threat to a 
company. 
 
Nevertheless, security should be a concern for each employee in an organization, not only IT 
professionals and top managers. One effective way to educate employees on the importance of 
security is a cybersecurity policy that explains each person's responsibilities for protecting IT systems 
and data. A cybersecurity policy sets the standards of behavior for activities such as the encryption of 
email attachments and restrictions on the use of social media (McAfee, 2020). 
 
Cyber Security Policy can define the data flow and define legal, operational, and ethical 
responsibility. Moreover, it can take a vital role to maintain according to other security standards and 
compliance. In that way, enterprises upgrade IT architecture in a standardized manner according to 
the policy so that application integration, collaboration, and performance contribute to 
cybersecurity.  
 
On the other hand, Risk management is another big part of governance. Risk management is the 
process of identifying potential risks, assessing the impact of those risks, and planning how to 
respond if the risks become a reality (Wu, 2019). Employes of the organization are the primary asset. 
They need to be aware of future responsibility according to a governance structure and potential 
risks to play an active role in the security breach. We can get an idea of how humans can play a vital 
role in Verizon’s 2018 data breach investigation report. Remarkably they found in their investigation 
21 
 
that 93% of all data breaches are caused directly by phishing activity where human interaction is fully 
involved (Wu, 2019). 
 
To prevent this attack organization's risk culture needs to evaluate. That is why enterprises focus on 
building a safe cyber interaction culture, train and delegate employees to identify and mitigate risk 
from various levels. If any incident happens, it would be determined and mitigated within the 
shortest time. Building separate risk analysis and incident response teams and coordinating all these 
activity governances can strengthen the organization. 
2.1.5 Cyber Security and Defense Intelligence: 
To understand the attack type, we need to assess the attack. The research papers of  (Hutchins et al., 
2011) and (Karen Scarfone et al., 2008) studied cyber-attack assessment and defense. They also 
referred to a model called cyber kill chan. This model gives an idea to a defender to develop resilient 
mitigations against intruders and intelligently prioritize investments in new technology or processes 
and drive defensive courses of action. 
 
Figure 3: Kill chain model for cybersecurity and defense (Hutchins et al., 2011) 
 
The author represented this kill chain model specifically for cybersecurity intrusions. This model is 
build considering computer network attack (CNA) or computer network espionage (CNE). Here in the 
model, reconnaissance is defined for research, identification, and selection of the target. The author 
wanted to describe the automated tool without the proper authorization to the system like Trojan by 
weaponization. The next step is the transmission of this weapon to the targeted system. Usually, by 
email, USB, attachment, file, or another medium, it can weaponize this.  After entering successfully, 
exploration can trigger according to the plan by a hacker to the victim host. On that occasion, most of 
the time, victims cannot understand what is happening to their system. After that, Trojan can install 
a virus program so that they can persistently stay in the victim system and operate unethically. The 
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victim system fully gets controlled by the hackers in this stage of C2 (Command and Control). They do 
not need to present to operate the system physically. All the access and command control 
mechanisms compromise by hackers. In most cases, the principal intention is to data exfiltration, 
encrypt, or blockage access from sensitive files or systems from the target systems.  
 
Here in the cybersecurity and defense kill chain, priorities analysis, detection, and synthesis are 
divided into proactive and reactive activity. The authors also mentioned adequate protection and 
detection measure could be taken in the visionary phase. Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, 
Exploration are the steps considered as a proactive activities. On the other hand, from exploitation, 
installation, C2 (Command and Control), and Action on the objective is regarded as a Reactive stage 
that means it required Response and Recovery.  
 
On the other side, researchers from this paper (Röcher, 2018) considered this kill chain model a 
cyber-attack methodology. They also agreed that a solid cybersecurity intelligence could stop the 
progression of the attack from preliminary steps, and organizations can take time to respond 
accordingly to safeguard their IT systems and data. 
2.1.6 Strategic Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) : 
In these recent years, enterprises improve their Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) competency using 
adequate technology, structured processes, well-trained people. This whole system can be 
responsible for gathering intelligence to enhance security. Such capability will ensure quick 
identification of any threat to detect it precisely and make proper response quickly. This CTI 
approach can play a vital role in cyber defense. Enterprise can easily be aware of new threats by 
external and internal intelligence. Here external intelligence means gathering and analyzes data 
regarding the pattern, sources, target, intention, losses, attacked system technology, response 
activity, etc., of cyber-attack in a similar industry. Exchanging data and ordinary intelligence among 
similar industries of central cybersecurity agencies from the government can also play a significant 
role in CTI. Nowadays, companies put more focus on internal intelligence to safeguard from cyber-
attack. For this reason, all kinds of access monitoring, central alert system implementation, monitor 
suspicious activity.  
 
A well efficient Cyber threat intelligence center (CTI) can carry significant importance for a company. 
By proper analysis and surveillance, it can reduce potential cyber risks. Furthermore, data leak 
prevention is a prime objective these days. Through accurate monitoring, CTI can identify the 
loophole of data bridge and possible difficulties if IT or business operation reduces risks. On the other 
hand, despite being attacked, CTI can reduce costs in many ways. For example, post-incident 
23 
 
investigation, figure out loss, suspect identification, fine calculation, lawsuit charges can be reduced 
if a proper CTI center works efficiently. 
 
Moreover, CTI can empower organizations by focusing on critical systems with all relevant security 
aspects to take less time to respond to any cyber-attack. CTI also has a few more importance on the 
strategic element. CTI can analyze the new state of the earth technique by cybercriminals. That way, 
an organization can get time to research a new approach to defense. Sometimes they can change the 
architecture or upgrade technology to protect themselves, which would play a vital role in the 
cybersecurity and defense strategical approach. Even they can find a way around to block the attack. 
Another crucial thing that CTI can play for a whole industry sector with sharing intelligence. In recent 
years many countries trying to follow this approach, specially EEU and North American countries, to 
safeguard from attack and make a dynamic strategic approach (Mavroeidis & Bromander, 2017). 
2.2 CYBER DEFENSE MODEL STRATEGIC APPROACH: 
Cyber Defense is one of the crucial parts to mitigate or respond to a cyber-attack. It also assists the 
users to link and transit between dimensions and sub-categories to apply appropriate defense 
mechanisms to cope with the ever-changing nature of cyber-attacks. Using an appropriate defense 
strategy requires the identification of all the key actors in cyberspace (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). 
 
After researching the number of scientific papers on Cyber Defense, a model was proposed with a 
taxonomy divided into three distinct dimensions. For a constructive Cyberdefense strategy, it is 
crucial to identify a thorough process in deep. To prepare a Cyberdefense strategy, an organization 
needs to understand the defense element and the capabilities to do. In that way, it would be easy to 
make an appropriate strategic approach for the respective company. Without a proper 
understanding of the cyber defense model, it would be challenging to decide.  
 
In that way, to represent a well efficient cyber defense base model, other authors described a high-
level approach but, this author emphasizes OODA loops for the cyber defense model  (Zager & Zager, 
2018). Researchers have combined the OODA loop with the NSA Methodology for Adversary 
Obstruction to create a new cyber‑defense model. The concepts of the OODA loop are used to make 
cybersecurity trustworthiness assessments (Arunkumar et al., 2013). OODA loop also allows you to 
learn from your past experiences and loop it again. That gives the improved performance after 
finishing and starting the loop.  
 
On the other hand, if we compare this model with the author tried to represent a cyber-defense 
model based upon the capability with asset and preparatory process (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). In 
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an IT environment, assets are company-owned information, software, and hardware used in business 
activities. In this paper, People are also considered because of having skills to react and prevent 
something. Even they are also the facilitator for any IT services. On the other hand, the preparation 
process is the readiness to protect from cyberattacks which will help to prepare a solid cyber 
response plan. For a cyber-defense strategy, the importance of such a preparation process is 
indispensable. Researchers included planning, communication, activation, and evaluate this process.     
 
Figure 4: Cyber capability defense model  (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). 
    
As the author prepared this model based on capability, they segregated defense in different stages. 
The first capability they mentioned is Passive Defense. Keeping cyber resilience with the protection 
of IT assets from cyber-attack, this part is highly dependent though it mentions as a passive defense 
role. Passive defense includes Protect (Whitelisting, Defense-in-depth, patching), Detect (monitoring, 
Surveillance, Interception), Respond (Network Segregation, Sill Switch), Recover (Disaster Recovery, 
Business continuity). Here protect and Detect can be considered a pre-attack stage, and Respond and 
Recover considered attack failure can cause serious harm to the company.  
 
Figure 5: Cyber capability passive defense model (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) 
  
The following capability of Cyber Defense is Active Defense. It is considered a  direct war with 
attackers. Even a researcher from this paper (Rosenzweig, 2013) refers to active defense as a real-
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time capability to minimize the impact of cyber-attacks. The author made Cyber Kinetic a branch of 
Active Defense divided into Destruction, Disruption, Delegation, Nullification, and Discovery. 
According to the knowledge from the related paper, it is pretty much understandable that Active 
defense capability would increase upon technological improvement, standardization of systems, and 
well-trained IT resources. In recent years, social engineering, also considered part of discovery, can 
gather data about human behavior.    
 
Figure 6: Cyber capability active defense model  (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) 
 
The following figure (Figure 3.2.4: Cyber capability collaborative defense model) illustrates the 
collaborative defense, which includes intelligence sharing, knowledge sharing, infrastructure sharing.                           
 
Figure 7: Cyber capability collaborative defense model (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) 
  
In this paper, researchers provided many clear elements of Actors. They wanted to illustrate the 
major actors of Cyberdefense so that it would be much understandable to whom we need to 
collaborate and cooperate. Organized actors give a high-level structural idea about the cyber defense 
that needs liaison with international authorities. Besides, authors represent Non Organized actors 




Figure 8: Cyber capability defense actors (Kolini & Janczewski, 2015) 
 
This cyber defense model gives a deeper understanding of the capabilities of an organization. It 
would be much identical and accessible to any modification and emphasize where it is needed for 
building a strategy. The component they mentioned is playing a vital role in the landscape of cyber 
defense strategy. In this world, the capability of swift response means a company is prepared to do in 
defense at any time. In fact, a solid Cyber Security and Defense strategic approach impacts the 
overall efficiency of the whole organization more in a positive manner.       
2.3 CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIC PILLARS: 
For developing a strategy, there is a number of pillars. One researcher demonstrates the 
fundamental pillars of effective international standard cybersecurity strategy, which is proposed 
based on (ISO/IEC, 2013). The organizational characteristic of cybersecurity is a set of 
recommendations from the simple person to the whole world. In this first pillar, we treat two 
concepts: Policy and Formation (Elkhannoubi, 2015). Here, the policy is applied all over the 
organization to enforce a new set of rules to standardize and efficient processes. Also, it can be used 
internally of the organization and externally of the organization among different departments of the 
specific spectrum of it. The rest of the two pillars they mentioned are Legal and technological. All 
respective contractual legislation, fulfilling cyber law, and regulatory compliance are considered 
under the legal pillar. Here technology is used as a reference ground to provide best-practice 
guidance for IT service management. With reference to upon paper, researchers illustrated the 
importance of the technology pillar. It service or data availability management, IT service continuity 
management, IT security management, Incident management are the core part of the Technology 
pillar. It is pretty clear that without technological improvement, any kind of cybersecurity strategy 
will not work out properly. That is why cybersecurity strategy should always be progressive upon 
new technological innovation, use, and technology adoption properly. If an organization cannot cope 
with new technology, business continuity and cyber defense will be seriously hampered. Even it 




Besides, another researcher presented how human behavior can play a vital role and be considered a 
cybersecurity defense strategy. “Many ignored the context in which much cybersecurity behavior 
occurs (i.e., the workplace), and the constraints and other demands on people’s time and resources 
that it causes. At the same time, there was evidence that models that stressed ways to enable 
appropriate cybersecurity behavior were more effective and useful than those that sought to use 
threat awareness or punishment to urge users towards more secure behavior”(Evans et al., 2016). 
Moreover, ENISA researchers conducted a CURRENT CYBERSECURITY HUMAN FACTOR STATISTICS 
survey where the importance of human behaviors in cybersecurity and defense is mentioned. Then, 
the authors came up with the proposal of a cybersecurity human vulnerability assessment 
framework (Evans et al., 2016). People can sometimes get tired of security procedures and 
processes, especially if they perceive security as an obstacle, preventing them from their primary 
task (e.g., being blocked from visiting a music download website because the browser has stated that 
the site might have malware). It can also be stressful to remain at a high level of vigilance and 
security awareness. These feelings describe the so-called ‘security fatigue, and they can be hazardous 
to an organization or society (Spiller, 2020). 
 
On the other hand, researchers more clearly describe and provide evidence of the Role of Human 
Factors/Ergonomics in the Science of Security, especially in Decision Making and Action Selection in 
Cyberspace (Proctor & Chen, 2015). The more considerable danger to our digital space is the threat 
of unauthorized access. Hackers always try to attempt to get data that is private or used but a set of 
people. Their one mistake can cause severe damage to a company. This evidence fill with the 
fundamental knowledge and the idea that people can play a vital role in Cybersecurity and Defense. 
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3. CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH MODEL  
Based on the conducted literature review, a conceptual model is was developed. The main idea of 
the research will be to propowition a CSCD framework and the identification of top risky control 
family. Here top risky control means a set of control contains high risk if they are not implemented in 
the enterprise. To achieve this objective, a clear picture of the CSCD Strategic Element needs to be 
established at first. Over the time the variation of cyber-attacks has been changing along with the 
Cyber threats. In order to propose CSCD Framework, it is essential to gather the attack process about 
current threats. Knowledge about different CSCD frameworks and strategic approaches can be 














Table 1: Conceptual model of research 
Document analysis is a form of qualitative research that uses a systematic procedure to analyze 
documentary evidence and answer specific research questions (Frey, 2018). Similar to other methods 
of analysis in qualitative research, document analysis requires repeated review, examination, and 
interpretation of the data in order to gain meaning and empirical knowledge of the construct being 
studied (Frey, 2018). Some authors published cybersecurity frameworks but proposed an improved 
version of the framework and some points need to be considered. Proper concept and clear 
understanding are the keys to this research. Having an appropriate concept of Business Centric 
Element, CSCD governance, CSCD intelligence, and Cybersecurity strategic pillars will be considered 
 Variants of Cyber Attacks 
 Cyber Threat Diversity 
 
  
Strategic Element of CSCD Improved CSCD Framework CSCD Framework Analysis 
Business Centric Strategic 
Element 
CSCD Governance 
CSCD Intelligence  
CD model Strategic 
Approach 
Cyber Security Strategic 
Pillars 
IT Asset 
CSCD Framwork Criteria 
RMM Level 
Security Impact Level 
CSCD Control Funcion 
CSCD Control 
Framework Diversity 
Controls for Distruptive 
Technologies 
CSCD Control Guideline 
Indentify Risky Controls 
Based on RMM Level 
Sophistication Level of 
Controls 
CSCD Control function 




the main backbone to start developing the CSCD framework because the proposed research requires 
thorough investigation and understanding of each strategic element. It is highly important to analyze 
the framework. Without analyzing the existing framework, it will not be possible to get a clear 
understanding of framework criteria and CSCD strategy. Based upon the strategic part, the 
component of the CSCD framework component is defined for an improved version. 
 
As the proposed framework is to be developed based on some renowned frameworks and 
guidelines, some improvement criteria need to be identified and integrate with the proposed 
framework development, improving control quality and providing a more transparent view to 
implement in the enterprises. During CSCD framework development, identifying the core element 
from the different diverse frameworks and adapting to the new guideline will make the framework 
more implementation friendly. Apart from that, we have seen the use of disrupted technologies is 
getting high in different enterprises. Most of the time, cybersecurity control is not much well defined 
for such technologies. This research will analyze the existing defined cybersecurity guidelines for 
disrupted technologies from different scientific papers. Cybersecurity control will be selected 
according to CSCD control type and criteria. Each element of CSCD framework development is vital to 
propose an improved version of the framework. 
 
The improved CSCD framework will include control guidelines according to security impact, 
organizational risk management maturity, and sophistication level. Moreover, each control is defined 
by control functions. New control guidelines mapped with criteria are considered as the 
improvement. The proposed framework will be designed with a number of new criteria. Each 
criterion defines the different aspects of the specific guideline. The priority, implementation pathway 
and categorization gives a clear idea about each control with regards of Cybersecurity and cyber 
defense aspect. Top risk controls have been identified throughout the holistic risk assessment score. 
Throughout the risk assessment, the risk impact of the emterprises for inactive controls can be 
identified.. A list of risky control according to different RMM levels is the outcome from the analysis 
and preparing control framework. Based on that, the enterprises can define a more accurate strategy 
for ensuring security resilience.     
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:   
To design overall work, exploratory type research design is followed throughout the research. This 
research typically involves qualitative methods to maintain quality, segregating category and better 
representation. Data analysis and model of CSCD control framework have been prepared to be based 
on Secondary data analysis and framework observation method of qualitative research. 
 
At first, I studied and analyzed the current CSCD Planning, Governance, and Control Guideline issue 
from different scientific papers was studied and analized to gather ideas, concepts, best practices, 
and a holistic view of the research objective. Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in 
which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment 
topic (Bowen, 2009). During the analyzing stage, many scientific papers and leading frameworks 
provide ideas about framework structure. Different approaches and diversity of frameworks are 
identified, and observations are noted for the work and control baseline preparation.  
 
Throughout this process, criteria of control baseline are developed. In a broad way, a comparison of 
different scientific papers, frameworks, and sources will be analyzed and mapped at one point to 
prepare the CSCD control framework. In this way, it enables the analyst to specify which elements of 
a framework are particularly relevant to particular questions and to make general working 
assumptions about the shape and strength of these elements where theories make assumptions that 
are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a specific phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict 
outcomes (Ostrom, 2011). Both data collection and analysis part is carried out by the qualitative 
research method. Different frameworks, theories, security models need to be analyzed carefully. The 
main objective is to prepare an improved CSCD framework with control guidelines and identify risky 
top control. The accuracy of the CSCD framework development depends on the research paper and 
the existing frameworks analysis part. Based upon the literature review, some parts are identified to 
improve. Precisely, CSCD impact criteria, organizational risk management maturity (RMM) level, and 
sophistication level of controls are recognized throughout the literature review for the improvement. 
Apart from that, the framework diversity and other guideline identification will be carried out in the 
development phase. The proposed hypothesis will be carefully evaluated and integrate with new 
framework development. This process will be followed by the quantitive research method. A 
theoretical model will be developed for setting the criteria based upon the concept, models, and 
secondary data from previous research papers. Besides, the new additional control guideline will be 
followed according to general qualitative inquiry. This approach will provide greater flexibility to 



























Figure 9: Research Methodology Overview.  
After this step, the defined hypothesis will be integrated into the proposed framework. To do that, 
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Here, pointing IT asset, control sophistication level, organizational maturity grade, CSCD control 
functions are the set of criteria where the controls will be assessed and defined. Nevertheless, 
mapping and adding new control in the guideline framework requires extensive review and analysis 
of the scope of work. The source of reference was maintained appropriately in each control during 
the data analysis part. Based on the related model and best practice, the whole control guideline 
review will be conducted in the qualitative method of the research model. This method is an 
approach that revolves collecting, analyzing and mixing quantitative data in a single study or series of 
studies in the belief that the information will provide a better understanding of the phenomenon 
than the methods would do separately (Schram, 2014). In that way, the proposed CSCD control 
guideline will be defined. Microsoft excel has been used as the data repository to make the CSCD 
control baseline and assessesment of the risk of each control. Also, Microsoft Excel-based data 





5. CSCD CONTROL FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC GUIDELINE AND PLANNING 
5.1  ASSUMPTION 
Based on a study in the literature review, about cybersecurity, cyber defense, Cyber Risk, 
Vulnerability, Cyber Hygiene, Cybersecurity and defense strategy, etc. I have understood that the 
researcher has to be more focused, careful, and knowledgeable in many fields. Despite all these, the 
following requirement must be fulfilled before conducting research activity. 
 Having a clear concept of different domains of IT and Cybersecurity is essential. A sound 
experienced person can not only understand the flow of data but also have clear visibility on the 
architecture of the systems. For the novice person, it will be a cognitive challenge to get a clear 
idea of how different IT functionally works and is connected to complete the operational activity.  
Higher proficiency in information security also suggests better performance in cyber detection 
than lower levels of knowledge (Bodeau et al., 2010). The researcher required strong expertise in 
IT hardware, software, network, database, application development, software testing, disruptive 
technologies, risk, vulnerability, IT strategy, IT management, etc., to understand and analyze. 
 Fundamental knowledge about the diverse types of attacks in cyberspace is highly required. The 
way of cyber-attacks has been changed in the recent years. Attackers are not using the same old 
techniques as before. Due to the evolving technologies, threat and attack patterns have been 
adjusted accordingly. These days AI Fuzzing, Machine Learning Poisoning, Deep fake, etc., are the 
new trending attack variant. (Caldwell et al., 2020). It would be challenging to determine specific 
attaches' detection and cyber defense mechanism without knowing the attack type. 
 One of the most essential things is understanding the difference between the cyber security 
framework and including controls in the data analysis. Many cybersecurity frameworks are 
existing, but all are not suitable to consider in the analysis part. Cybersecurity frameworks 
defending against cyber-attacks have appeared to be generally fragmented and varying widely in 
effectiveness (Atoum et al., 2014). Moreover, Cybersecurity frameworks integrate a set of high-
level conceptual security controls, solutions, entities, tools, techniques, or mechanisms to 
collectively collaborate Cybersecurity strategy (Atoum et al., 2014). 
 Well-defined Cybersecurity and Cyber Defense framework lays out the ground for a conceptual, 
coherent, systematic, overarching, and consolidated approach to implement cybersecurity 
strategies (Atoum et al., 2014). Having an understanding of strategy precisely IT strategy, and IT 
management are the key to this research. Based on CSCD control analysis, a set of data will be 
produced. Proper illustration of results will help management to define strategies for the 
organization and implement the guidelines to defend from cyber-attacks.   
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 Risk analysis is an important activity that organizations must perform to prevent the attacks 
and/or adverse consequences that can arise from them (Atoum et al., 2014). People using many 
applications and devices without having much knowledge of them, which increases the risk of 
cyber threats. Cyberattacks represent an essential issue for all organizations concerned with 
economic impacts and interested in protecting its full scope of digital. (Henriques de Gusmão et 
al., 2018) That’s is why risk analysis plays an indispensable role in cybersecurity and cyber 
defense.  According to  (Patel et al., 2008), risk-assessment methods can be either qualitative or 
quantitative. Qualitative risk-assessment methods are used primarily in cases where risk-
assessment calculations are simple and, therefore, when it is either unnecessary or impossible to 
quantify threat frequency and other technical issues. The quantitative risk analysis methods are 
mathematical instruments for evaluating risk where mathematical procedures, such as fuzzy 
theory, fault trees, and multi-criteria methods, are used. Thus it is pretty much clear that 
organizations must have complete skill resources who can do risk analysis using the proper 
technique. 
 Data collection is another crucial part of the research. Quality of study will not achieve if data 
collection is done from an unauthentic source. As this research will be done based on 
cybersecurity frameworks, choosing an appropriate framework and ability to sort out control will 
provide many accurate study results. Nevertheless, collecting data from renowned frameworks 
increases the quality of research and is more effective in improving the control framework from 
the existing one.   
5.2  STUDY AND ANALYZE MAJOR CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER DEFENSE FRAMEWORK AND 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
First, it needs to understand different frameworks for preparing CSCD control and then identifying 
high-risk control families. Following frameworks are analyzed to do this research. 
SL Framework Name and Reference Year SL Framework Name and Reference Year 
1 NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5, 
Security and Privacy Controls for 
Information Systems and Organizations 
(Commerce & Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., 2020). 
2020 2 GDPR (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (Brodin, 2019), (GDPR EU, 
2018). 
2017 
3 NIST Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1, 
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments 
(Rebecca M. Blank. Patrick D. Gallagher, 
2012) 
2012 4 FISMA (Federal Information Systems 
Management Act) (FISMA, 2020) 
2020 
5 NIST Special Publication 800-34 Revision 1, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal 
Information Systems (Swanson et al., 
2010). 
2020 6 CISA Review Manual (CISA, 2014) 2014 
7 NIST Special Publication 800-39, Managing 
Information Security Risk Organization, 
2011 8 Cloud Security Alliance’s Security 




Mission, and Information System View 
(NIST, 2011). 
Cloud Computing v4.0 (CSA, 2017) 
9 NIST Special Publication 800-95, Guide to 
Secure Web Service (Winograd et al., 
2007). 
2007 10 CSA, Guide to Conducting Cybersecurity 
Risk Assessment for Critical Information 
Infrastructure (CSA, 2019) 
2019 
11 NIST Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cyber security (Barrett, 
2018). 
2018 12 CSA’s Perspective on Cloud Risk 
Management (CSA, 2020) 
2020 
13 NISTIR 8183, Revision 1, Cybersecurity 
Framework Version 1.1 Manufacturing 
Profile (Stouffer et al., 2020). 
2020 14 CSA Guide to the IoT Security Controls 
Framework Version 2 (CSA, 2021) 
2021 
15 NIST Special Publication 800-12,Revision 1, 
An Introduction to Information Security 
(Nieles & Dempsey, 2017). 
2020 16 CYBER RESILIENCE REVIEW (CRR) (Agency, 




Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCIDSS), Requirements and 
Security Assessment Procedures, Version 
3.2.1 (PCIDSS, 2018). 
2018 18 Digital Container Shipping Association, 
DCSA Implementation Guide for Cyber 
Security on Vessels v1.0 (DCSA, 2020) 
2020 
19 ISO/IEC 27001:2013, INFORMATION 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT (ISO, 2013) 
2013 20 ENISA, technical guidelines for the 
implementation of minimum security 
measures for DSPs (ENISA, 2016b) 
2016 
21 ISO/IEC 27002:2013, Information 
technology — Security techniques — Code 
of practice for information security 
controls 
(ISO/IEC, 2013) 
2013 22 ENISA, Cyber Insurance: Recent 
Advances, Good Practices and Challenges 
(ENISA, 2006) 
2016 
23  IASME Governance standard (Dresner et 
al., 2018). 
 24 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of 
Things: Baseline Requirements, ETSI TS 
103 645 V2.1.2 (ETSI, 2020) 
2020 
25 SOC 2® - SOC for Service Organizations: 
Trust Services Criteria (ASEC, 2020) 
2017 26 Guideline on Effectively Managing 
Security Service in the Cloud (Chen, 2018) 
2018 
27 CIS Controls, v7.1 (CIS, 2019). 
 
2019 28 ISO/IEC Information technology — IT 
asset management, Third edition (ISO, 
1987) 
2017 
29 CIS RAM (CIS, 2018). 2019 30 ENISA, Cyber Security Culture in 
organisations(ENISA, 2017) 
2017 
31 COBIT Framework Introduction 
Methodology (Lanter, 2019). 
2019 32 ETSI TR 103 305 critical Security 




33 COSO (Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations)(Galligan & Rau, 2015). 
2015 34 ENISA, Economics of vulnerability 
disclosure (ENISA, 2018b) 
2018 
35 TC CYBER (Technical Committee on Cyber 
Security) (ETSI, 2015a, 2018b), (ETSI, 
2018b), (ETSI, 2016c), (ETSI, 2016b), (ETSI, 
2016a), (ETSI, 2018a), (ETSI, 2018c) 
2018-
2020 
36 ENISA, Cybersecurity Culture Guidelines: 
Behavioural Aspects of Cybersecurity 
(ENISA, 2018a) 
2018 
37 HITRUST (Health Information Trust 
Alliance)(Hitrust CSF, 2020) 
2020 38 Fed RAMP (Federal Risk and 
Authorization Management Program) 
(FEDRAMP, 2020), (FEDRAMP, 2017a), 
(FEDRAMP, 2017b), (FEDRAMP, 2018), 
(Fedramp, 2018). 
2017 
39 CISQ (Consortium for IT Software Quality)  40 HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) (Hipaa, 2020) 
2018 
41 The Ten Steps to Cybersecurity 2021 42 NIST Special Publication 800-161 
Supply Chain Risk Management 




Systems and Organizations (Boyens et 
al., 2015). 
43 ENISA Work programme: Including 
multiannual planning  (ENISA, 2016a) 
2016 44 Bigdata : security and Privacy 
handbook by CSA  (CSA, 2016). 
2016 
 
Table 2: Analized major framework and research papers  
5.3  CSCD CONTROL FRAMEWORK CONCEPT 
Framework is needed to implement cybersecurity in the national and international environments 
that address the hyper-connectivity (Dawson, 2017). In this twenty-first century, the use of devices 
and information systems has been increased than any other time before. For that reason, 
cybersecurity threats have been improved dramatically, especially on critical information systems 
and cyberspace. A solid structure and methodology are required to protect critical assets. CSCD 
framework is a kind of guidelines and best practices that will help identify potential risk on critical 
infrastructure or asset and direct to mitigate. Literally, the framework is required to straighten the 
resilience of information systems and safe use of cyberspace (Barrett, 2018). Here the term critical 
infrastructure is significant for understanding framework structure.  
 
The proposed cybersecurity framework is based on the critical asset. Identifying critical assets for any 
kind of company is essential. This fast-changing world of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and the increasing use of Operational Technology (OT) introduces new 
cybersecurity-related risks to critical infrastructures (CI), critical information infrastructures (CII), 
essential services, and societies at large (Ritchey, 2019). In an attempt to mitigate and manage this 
cyber risk, nations have created or are creating CI protection (CIP) and cybersecurity-related laws and 
regulations (Ritchey, 2019). 
 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) is defined as “an asset, system or part thereof located in the Member 
States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, 
economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a 
significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions”  (The 
Council of the European Union, 2013). Apart from that, according to an executive order by ex-
American precedent, critical infrastructure means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, 
or any combination of those matters (Obama, 2013) as all type of data is stored in the asset like 
database, hardware or another electronic device for organization’s business and operation 
purpose. For this reason, identification of critical infrastructure and asset can make easy to 
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prepare CSCD framework and its implication. Moreover, to manage cybersecurity risks, a clear 
understanding of the organization’s business drivers and security considerations specific to its use 
of technology is required. Because each organization’s risks, priorities, and systems are unique, the 
tools and methods used to achieve the outcomes described by the Framework will vary (Barrett, 
2018). 
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cyber Security Framework organizes 
cybersecurity activities in five categories: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. The 
recovery category differentiates this framework from all other frameworks. The NIST framework 
recognizes the importance of recovery planning and suggests the development, implementation, and 
maintenance of plans for timely recovering and restoring any capabilities or services impaired by a 
cyber-attack (Roure et al., 2019). 
5.4  CSCD CONTROL FRAMEWORK FUNDAMENTAL 
In this part, we will elaborate on some fundamental topics about the CSCD control framework. It is 
always vital for enterprises to select specific controls that align with their business strategy, 
functions, priorities, and capability to minimize risk from potential threats. In preparation for 
selecting and tailoring the appropriate security control baselines for 
organizational systems and their respective environments of operation, organizations first 
determine the criticality and sensitivity of the information to be processed, stored, or 
transmitted by those systems where the process of determining information criticality and sensitivity 
is known as security categorization (Commerce & Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., 2020). Here its is observed that 
the author also elaborates the tailoring approach of control baseline on a variety of factors not 
limited to threat information, mission or business requirements, types of systems, sector-specific 
requirements, specific technologies, operating environments, organizational assumptions and 
constraints, individuals’ privacy interests, laws, executive orders, regulations, policies, directives, 
Standards, or industry best practices, etc. In this framework, we collected different controls from 
various frameworks considering the above tailoring approach for other organizations. Through our 
research output, we can present a control category based on organizational Risk Management 
Maturity level (RMM). Different types of organizations are distinguished and categorized based on 
CSCD control implementation and Cyber resilience maturity level. Since the value of impact may not 
be the same for a particular system or control for different RMM level organizations, we use score-
based impact and likelihood calculation for measuring potential risk for specific controls. Besides, 
every control has a specific sophistication level based on the defined criteria. This sophistication level 
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gives the understanding of the criticality and perfection of making a CSCD plan and implementation 
accuracy. 
 
Moreover, CSCD framework function is defined too for each control according to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cyber Security Framework, where cybersecurity activates are 
defined in five categories: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover (Roure et al., 2019).   In 
this framework model, I have underlined subcategories under these CSCD activities. A set of 
subcategories are listed in a central control category with a similar set of controls based on specific 
systems/ domains/ technologies. Thus, we can get an idea about CSCD top rules for different RMM 
level enterprises throughout this research, which will provide a guideline to decision-makers of the 
organization to make strategies and plan for cyber resilience. 
5.5  FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION 
An organization can improve risk management by implementing this CSCD framework. Control 
sophistication level gives an understanding about implementing the approach of the specific risk. 
Controls can easily be implemented according to the RMM level. Specific organization can determine 
rules which are aligned with their business need and overall risk management capability. Risk 
management considerations include many aspects of cybersecurity, including the degree to which 
privacy and civil liberties considerations are integrated into an organization’s cybersecurity risk 
management and potential risk responses (Barrett, 2018).  
For any kind of framework implementation, it requires a process to follow. Enterprises face a lot of 
complexity and challenges to implementing a new process or framework. CSCD is a sensitive part for 
enterprises. Most enterprises follow the corporate governance model to implement a security 
framework. Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute prepared a model to 
implement a framework according to their organizational structures. This model is known as the 





Figure 10: IDEAL model elaboration (Poore, 2006). 
This phase included 15 activities. Though it was developed for software process improvement, now it 
can be used in cybersecurity (Poore, 2006). That means enterprises can follow IDEAL model to 
implement the CSCD framework.  
 
 
Figure 11: IDEAL model framework implementation (Poore, 2006). 
This author (Poore, 2006) describes each segment of the IDEAL model. Here activities of each phase 
are going to explain accordingly. In the initial phase, simulate of changes means the changes which 
are needed. The next part is the level of risk acceptable to the organization where the organization 
can have a quick evaluation for the risk management process. All stakes understanding and 
agreement are required for changes and implementation, which led sponsor of the change initiative. 
Charter infrastructure defines the resources that will do actual activities. 
A thorough assessment of the organization’s security posture can characterize the current and 
desired stage of diagnosing phase. The recommendation can be placed after this assessment. Thirdly, 
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in establishing phase, priorities can be set from the recommendation bases on criteria like business 
drivers, business area impact, and perhaps a recent risk assessment or audit. Based on the 
recommendations, a proper approach can be developed with an aspect of current skill set, maturity, 
capability, and actual requirement. 
 
The acting phase is the actual implementation of the framework. Here test and refine the solution 
and later install or implement happen if all tests and refine validated and comply. Lastly, analysis and 
validation will be done along with proposing future action in the learning phase.   
5.5.1 CSCD Governance  
Cyber risk, security, and defense governance is a complex thing that required multi-function 
coordination. IT assets will be managed through CSCD governance involving different stakeholders.  
An effective CSCD governance system can improve threat identification, risk, and resource 
optimization. As CSCD management is a part of IT management, that is why we can do CSCD 
management and governance according to the way of IT management and governance. Governance 
ensures that stakeholder needs, conditions, and options are evaluated to determine balanced, 
agreed-on enterprise objectives to be achieved, setting direction through prioritization and decision 
making, and monitoring performance and compliance against agreed-on laws and objectives (Lanter, 
2019). CSCD governance processes are the Information Security/Cybersecurity activities that support 
organizational goals. These main components of CSCD governance ensure that the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of an organization’s electronic assets are maintained all the time, and 
information is never compromised (Von Solms, 2001). This also becomes a cyber-security governance 
concern if the information is transmitted via the internet. (Jennex & Zyngier, 2007) argue for the 
need for the organization to ensure that codified knowledge is recent and comprehensive, which 
again reflects the need for integrity. It is observed that (Johnston & Hale, 2009) confirmed empirically 
that the organizations that address their Information Security from the bottom up and isolate the 
governance from the management of IS have ineffective IS programs and can fall victim to internal 
and external cybersecurity attacks, in contrast to organizations whose CSCD governance programs 




Figure 12: CSCD governance level (Gashgari et al., 2017). 
So organizations can need to follow this model to maintain proper CSCD governance. Governance 
can be applied to the entire enterprise, an entity, a tangible or intangible asset, etc. It is possible to 
define different views of the enterprise to which governance is applied, and it is essential to define 
this scope of the governance system well (Lanter, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 13: Roles, Activities, and Relationships interaction for CSCD governance (Lanter, 2019). 
The author also clarifies element of governance roles, activities and relationships which defines who 
is involved in governance, how they are involved, what they do and how they interact, within the 
scope of any governance system. In COBIT 5, a clear differentiation is made between governance and 
management activities in the governance and management domains, as well as the interfacing 
between them and the role players that are involved.    
5.6  CSCD FRAMEWORK COMPONENT 
In this part, a comprehensive view of the CSCD framework component will be elaborated. After 
analyzing several scientific frameworks and control documents, a set of criteria are defined for 
preparing control baseline and risk analysis. 
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5.6.1 CSCD Control Criteria   
A set of criteria are the element to define the CSCD control plan. Based on that criteria, it would be 
well defined and structured to represent the CSCD guideline/control. Basically, in a greater sense, 
cybersecurity means IT asset security. It also means collecting tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, 
assurance, and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and 
user's assets (International Telecommunication Union, 2008). After analyze and observation that 
most authors and leading papers (NIST, ISO) represented the CSCD control plan according to the 
asset. In this way, I represent my CSCD guideline control criteria like below according to the asset.   
• Parent Control 
• Sub Control 
• Sub Control Detail 
• IT Asset Type 
• CSCD Function 
• Sophistication Level 
• RMM (Risk Management Maturity) Level  
• Risk Level 
- Impact and Likelihood. 
 
NIST defined a Cybersecurity framework based on Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover, 
which are considered one of the structured frameworks (Barrett, 2018). 
5.6.1.1  Parent Control Family 
Parent control family has been designed based on different distinct focus areas of IT. Enterprises 
have different criticality in other functions according to their business nature.  Despite that, the 
overall cybersecurity risk for all RMM level organizations is similar. Here, a list of leading parent 
control families is identified where all the control and risk level will be defined in a sub-category 
under this.  
No Parent Control Family Trigram 
1 Security Strategy and Planning  SSP 
2 Policy, Business Continuity and compliance PBC 
3 Hardware Asset Management  HAM 
4 Software Asset Management  SAM 
5 Vulnerability Management VM 
6 Privileged Access Management PAM 
7 Identity, Access And  Authentication Management IAA 
8 Configuration Management (Hardware, Software, Mobile device, laptop, CM 
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Workstation, servers, Iota, etc.) 
9 Maintenance, Monitoring and Log Management MML 
10 Email,  Browser and Web Protections EBW 
11 Malware Defense Management MDM 
12 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services LCN 
13 Network Device Security (Firewall, Routers, Switch and etc.) NDS 
14 Network Defense ND 
15 Wireless Access Control WAC 
16 Data Protection, Recovery and Backup DPR 
17 Application Software Security ASS 
18 Risk Assessment and Management RAM 
19 Incident Response and Management IRM 
20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises PTR 
21 Security Awareness and Training SAT 
22 External Service Management ESM 
 
             Table 3: CSCD Parent Control Family 
  
For data processing purposes, a short tri name is given to each control family so that it makes a 
straightforward representation of the result. 
5.6.1.2  Sub Control 
Sub controls are a set of controls under specific control family. Each sub-control is defined by the 
CSCD control function. Different enterprises are mapped under sub-control based on the RMM level. 
Actual control is described in this sub-control section.   
5.6.1.3  Sub Control Detail 
Each sub-control has a proper definition and elaboration in the sub-control detail section. Control 
implementation idea can be found from here. 
5.6.1.4  IT Asset Type 
IT asset is the essential part of this research because all the controls are defined based on specific 
asset types. The organization identifies its business/mission objectives and high-level organizational 
priorities. With this information, the organization makes strategic decisions regarding cybersecurity 
implementations and determines the scope of systems and assets that support the selected business 
line or process (Barrett, 2018). Through the CSCD control measures, enterprises minimize the threats 
and risks.  As because information associated with IT assets is typically voluminous, highly complex, 
and fast-changing, it is likely that organizations with such information will need to make use of 
automated information systems (ISO, 2017). After analyzing a number of scientific papers and 
frameworks, we defined the IT asset category, which gives a clear idea about different types of 
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assets. In this way, it provides a comprehensive view to map, analyze and implement specific CSCD 
controls. 
Asset Type Detail Source 
Data Any form of data, Database, DBMS , Bigdata,  (ISO, 2017), 
(NIST CSRC, 
2021) 
IT Hardware Physical IT equipment: 
Servers, End users Devices, Network Devices, 
Switch, Firewall, Router, Communications 
equipment, IP, etc 
Physical Media 





Source code, API, Web services, Functional 




Fonts, Configurations, property files, binaries, 





Firmware, virtual Machines, Embedded software (ISO, 2017). 
Digital Information Content Digital assets with information content, e.g., 
documents, audio, video, graphics,  free-standing 
dictionaries, etc. 
(ISO, 2017). 
IT Services Combination of IT assets and non-IT assets, 
typically externally supplied, treated as IT assets, 
e.g., Software as a service, PAAS, IAAS  hardware 
maintenance, training, etc. Wifi, Email 
(ISO, 2017). 
IT Contracts Digital or physical contract document  (ISO, 2017). 
IT Licenses Digital and Physical license document (ISO, 2017). 
IT Platform Operation systems, Computing Systems, Database 
platform, storage platform, mobile platform, 
storage platform, application platform, CMS 
platform, media platform, API platform, analytics 
platform, Security platform, robotics platform, IoT 
platform, AI platform, game platform, etc. 
Framework, Software development platform, 
tools, Block chain 
(ISO, 2017). 
Strategic assets Policy, Process, Procedure 
Example of Policy: Application Access policy, 
Provision policy, Service threshold policy, etc.  
Example of the process : (App Dev 
Code Promotion, Maintenance, Change 
Management, Vulnerability Mgt, Account Setup, 
Account Maintenance 
New Client On boarding, Internal Audit, 
Device/System set-up, Customer Support).  
Documentation: UAT, User manual, IT process, IT 








Trade secrets, Franchises, Reputation, Brand, 
Goodwill 
2007) 
User Personnel, End-user, Administrative user, Business 
user, Employee, Client, Customer,  Developer, Any 
IT Asset user. 
(ISO, 2017). 
Organizational Asset Organization (ISO, 2017). 
Non-IT Asset  Provider designation, Provide role, 
Communication Protocol 
(ISO, 2017). 
N/A Not to categorize  




Table 4: IT Asset Type 
5.6.1.5  CSCD Framework Function:  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cyber Security Framework organizes 
cybersecurity activities in five categories: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. The 
recovery category differentiates this framework from all other frameworks. The NIST framework 
recognizes the importance of recovery planning and suggests the development, implementation, and 
maintenance of plans for timely recovering and restoring any capabilities or services that were 
impaired by a cyber-attack (Roure et al., 2019). This CSCD framework utilize this framework function 
model to define control categories and subcategories under specific function. 
 
Figure 14: NIST cybersecurity framework function (Barrett, 2018). 
 (Barrett, 2018) describes perfectly in NIST framework about each function as like bellow. CSCD 
framework also adapts function specifications. 
• Identify: Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, 
assets, data, and capabilities (Barrett, 2018). Understanding the business context, the resources that 
support critical functions, and the related cybersecurity risks enables an organization to focus and 
prioritize its efforts, consistent with its risk management strategy and business needs (Barrett, 2018). 
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• Protect: Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services 
where the Protect Function supports the ability to limit or contain a potential cybersecurity event 
(Barrett, 2018).   
• Detect: Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity 
event (Barrett, 2018). 
• Respond: Develop and implement appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected and 
the ability to contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity incident (Barrett, 2018).   
• Recover: Develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to 
restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident (Barrett, 
2018).    
5.6.1.6  CSCD Control Sophistication Level 
According to  (ENISA, 2016b) specification, Security measures are categorized into three 
sophistication levels like below. Each level contains the practices to assess the adequacy of the 
design and evidence that should be provided in order to check the effective implementation of the 
security practice (ENISA, 2016b). 
 
No SOPHISTICATION LEVEL DESCRIPTION OF SOPHISITICATION LEVELS 
1 Basic - Basic security measures that could be implemented to reach the 
security objective 
- Examples that basic measures are in place 
2 Industry standard - Industry standard security measures to reach the objective and 
an ad-hoc review of the implementation, following changes or 
incidents. 
- Examples of Industry standard measures and evidence of reviews 
of the implementation reacting to changes and/or incidents.                     
3 State of the art - State of the art (advanced) security measures, and continuous 
monitoring of implementation, structural review of 
implementation, taking into account changes, incidents, tests, and 
exercises, to proactively improve the implementation of security 
measures 
- Examples of state of the art (advanced) implementation, 
evidence of a structural review process, and evidence of pro-active 




Table 5: CSCD control sophistication level (ENISA, 2016b). 
5.6.1.7  Organizational CSCD Risk Management Maturity (RMM) Level  
Implementation of CSCD guidelines is not easy for every type of organization. It requires skillful 
resources and adequate organizational culture. Based upon organizational resource and asset 
availability. There are different types of organization exist in the world and their IT asset, resources, 
CSCD tactics, Cyber Intelligence Capability are not in same level. Even some companies might have a 
limited number of resources, but the CSCD capability would be higher than other mid size enterprise. 
Mid or large organizations have the ability to enable the latest technologies, but the lack of proper 
use and knowledge of the technology, companies, may not implement the guidelines properly. Some 
authors defined the maturity of the organizations based upon some specified criteria. CSCD control 
guidelines implementations would be different from organization to organization. Measuring 
organizational maturity grade would be more effective for preparing guidelines and implement them 
to the enterprises (US Department of Homeland Security, 2014). Based upon some defined criteria 
collected from (Barrett, 2018), (CIS, 2019) and (ISO IEC, 2013), we prepare organizational CSCD 
Control Maturity level categorization like below. 
 
Criteria Micro to Small (A) Small to Medium (B) Medium to Large (C) Large to Super Large (D) 
Number of Employees 5 ≤ 500 501 ≤ 5000 5001 ≤ 50000 50001 ≤ 0.5M 
Data Sensibility and Criticality (Financial, Personal, 
Health, Secrete data, etc.) 
Very low to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
 




Brand Value Low to Medium Medium to High High to Significant Significant to Extreme 
Cyber Security Expertise Low to Medium Medium to High High to Significant High to Significant 
IT Expertise Resources Very low to Low Low to Medium High to Significant High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Company Asset (Hardware, Software, Data, People ) Limited Moderate Significant to Extreme Significant to Extreme 
CSCD Practice Adaption Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant High to Significant 
Integrated Governance Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Enabling Technology Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Research Centre  Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Process and Methodology Adaption Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Quality and Risk Management Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Cyber Intelligence Capability Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Cyber Defense Capability (Active, Passive, Collaborative) Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Digital Products Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Dependency on Digital Platforms Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Process Automation Enabling Limited to Low Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
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Client/Customer impact (Financial, Reputational, 
Confidentiality, others) on Provided Services 
Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
 
Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Low to Medium   
Medium to High 
High to Significant 
Significant to Extreme 
Risk Management Process -CSCD Risk 
management practice is 
Not formalized 
- Ad hoc risk manages 
Low CSCD priority 
-Prioritization of  CSCD 
risk may not be directly 
informed by 
organizational 
Risk objectives, the 





is Approved but not 
established.  
-Prioritization of  CSCD 
risk will be directly 
informed by 
organizational 







is Approved and 
expressed as policy. 
-Prioritization of  CSCD 
risk will be regularly 
informed and updated 
by organizational 





-CSCD Risk management 
practice is Approved and 
expressed based on 
previous and current 
CSCD activity and policy. 
-Prioritization of  CSCD 
risk will be regularly 






Integrated Risk Management Program -Limited CSCD 
Awareness at 
Organizational Level. 




sharing process within 
the organization 
-CSCD risk assessment is 
not repeatable and 
reoccurring 
-Limited to Low CSCD 
Awareness at 
Organizational Level. 
-Limited to Low CSCD 
Risk Management 
implementation. 
- Limited to Low or 
Informal CSCD 
information sharing 
process in few parts of 
the organization. 
-CSCD risk assessment 
is not repeatable and 
reoccurring 
-Medium to High CSCD 
Awareness at 
Organizational Level. 




- Medium to High or 
formal CSCD 
information sharing 
process in few parts of 
the organization. 
-CSCD risk assessment 
is consistently and 
It is accurately 
monitoring regularly 
by appointed skillful 
resources with proper 
role and responsibility. 
-High to Significant CSCD 
Awareness at 
Organizational Level. 
- High to Significant CSCD 
Risk management 
implementation. 
- High to Significant or 
formal CSCD information 
sharing process in few 
parts of the organization. 
-CSCD risk assessment is 
consistently and 
Accurately monitoring 
regularly financial and 
organizational risks by 
appointed handy 
resources with proper 
role and responsibility. 
External Participation -No Understanding of 
organizational role and 
ecosystem. 
- No collaboration 
among entities and 
stakeholders for 
information sharing. 
-Unaware of the cyber 
supply chain risks of the 
products and services. 









- Limited to Low 
awareness of the 
cyber supply chain 
risks of the products 
and services. 
 









- Medium to High 
awareness of the 
cyber supply chain 
risks of the products 
and services. 
 
- High to Significant 
Understanding of 
organizational role and 
ecosystem. 
- High to Significant 
collaboration among 
entities and stakeholders 
for information sharing. 
- High to Significant 
awareness of the cyber 
supply chain risks of the 
products and services. 
 
 
 Table 6: CSCD Risk Management maturity Level enterprise category 
5.6.1.8  CSCD Risk Analysis 
CSCD risk assessment is very important for organizations. To better predict system vulnerabilities, 
cybersecurity researchers are developing new and more holistic approaches to characterizing 
cybersecurity system risk (King et al., 2018). Methods of cyber risk assessment attempt to address 
the challenges surrounding cybersecurity issues (Ganin et al., 2020). Determine the levels of 
cybersecurity risk that they are exposed to a good understanding of the risk levels would allow an 
organization to dedicate adequate action and resources to treat risks of the highest priority (CSA, 
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2019). Through the tools, an organization can assess the risks affecting its assets and what security 
controls and insurance decisions should be implemented to reduce the likelihood and/ or eventual 
impacts of cyber threats (Couce-Vieira et al., 2020). 
 
Moreover, create a risk-aware culture within the organisation, and also, Risk assessment is an 
iterative process that involves engaging employees to think about technology risks and how they 
align to business objectives (CSA, 2019). Basically, risk assessment is a key component of a holistic, 
organization-wide risk management process (NIST, 2011). The author also provided illustrated view of 
the risk management process, which includes: (i) framing risk; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) responding to 
risk, and (iv) monitoring risk. 
 
         
 
Figure 15: Risk assessment within risk management process (NIST, 2011). 
Moreover, enterprises get a much clear view of the level of risk management. (Kelley, 2014) 
illustrated the three-level of organization-wide risk management wherein level 1 includes 
Organization, Level 2 Mission and Business process, and level 3 includes system (Environment of 
operation). Security-related information goes bottom to top, and Risk tolerance & aggregated risk 




                          
 
Figure 16: Organization-wide risk management (Kelley, 2014). 
 
For all kinds of strategic focus transmits level one towards level 3. All the tactical and gradual control 
relates risks will be managed at the system level. Here in this chapter, we will describe about the 
process of risk assessment along with risk framing, risk tolerance level, risk level criteria. 
5.6.1.8.1 Risk Define Criteriaan Tolerance  
We care about defining CSCD risk based on impact and likelihood.  
 
Risk = Impact * Likelihood. 
 
Here overall risk is defined based on the likelihood of a given threat event exercising on a 
vulnerability of an asset and the resulting impact of the occurrence of the threat event (CSA, 2019). 
Each of the risk factors mentioned in the definition is explained below. 
Threat Event: Threat event refers to any event during which a threat actor, through threat vector, 
acts against an asset in a manner that has the potential to cause harm. In the context of 
cybersecurity, threat events can be characterized by the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 
employed by threat actors (CSA, 2019). 
Vulnerability: Vulnerability refers to a weakness in the design, implementation, and operation of an 
asset or the internal control of a process (CSA, 2019). 
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Likelihood: Likelihood refers to the probability that a given threat event is capable of exploiting a 
shared vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities). The possibility can be derived based on factors, 
namely, discoverability, exploitability, and reproducibility (CSA, 2019). 
Impact: Impact refers to the magnitude of harm resulting from a threat event exploiting a 
vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities). The magnitude of harm can be estimated from the perspective 
of a nation, organization, or individual (CSA, 2019). 
 
According to the (CSA, 2019), we have defined risk level and tolerance description like below. In 
addition, we developed a risk tolerance level based on the calculated risk score.  
 
Risk Level  Risk Tolerance Description Tolerance Level 
Very High (5) This level of risk cannot be accepted and would create an impact 
so severe that the related activity would need to cease 
immediately. Alternatively, mitigation or transference strategies 
need to be taken immediately. 
 301≤ 375 
High  (4) This level of risk cannot be accepted. Treatment strategies aimed 
at reducing the risk level should be developed and implemented 
in the next one month. 
 226≤ 300 
Medium High  (3) This level of risk cannot be accepted. Treatment strategies aimed 
at reducing the risk level should be developed and implemented 
in the next 3-6 months. 
 151≤ 225 
Medium  (2) This level of risk can be accepted if there are no treatment 
strategies that can be easily and economically implemented. The 
risk must be regularly monitored to ensure that any change in 
circumstance is detected and acted upon appropriately. 
 76≤ 150 
Low  (1) This level of risk can be accepted if there are no treatment 
strategies that can be easily and economically implemented. The 
risk must be periodically monitored to ensure that any change in 
circumstances is detected and acted upon appropriately. 
 0≤ 75 
 
 Table 7: CSCD Risk Tolerance Level 
Measuring Risk tolerance threshold level:  
We have used a simple formula to calculate the risk tolerance threshold. Multiply of impact and 
likelihood create risk score of specific control. There are five criteria for measuring impact and three 
criteria for likelihood. Each criterion has one to five levels. For calculating impact or likelihood scores, 




                                                 Impact Score Measurement   
 
   × 
 
           Likelihood Score Measurement 
Criterion Confidenti
ality 








Level  Level     
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 8: Process of measuring impact and likelihood 
 
That is how the total summation of impact / Likelihood score can be multiplied to get a risk score. 
Then risk level can be defined by the risk threshold matrix. As an example, for a specific control, we 
can assume the impact and likelihood score will be like below.  
 
                                                 Impact Score Measurement   
 
   × 
 
           Likelihood Score Measurement 
Criterion Confidenti
ality 








Level  Level     
5 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 
3 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 
 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 
 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
 Table 9: Impact and likelihood score calculation 
So we get an impact score 17 (5+4+3+2+3), and a Likelihood score is 12 (4+4+4). We will get a risk 
score If we now multiply both values. According to our example, the risk score is 204. According to 
the risk tolerance level, specific control can create medium-level risk for the organization if it has not 
been implemented.  
 
Basically, the risk tolerance score is the multiply value of impact and likelihood score. According to 
this framework, the highest risk tolerance score is 375. The risk level is defined into five categories. 
We have used fair calculation to specify risk tolerance levels. As we have 5 risk levels and total 
multiplied value of impact and likelihood can be a maximum 375, we divide this maximum value with 
5 to get per risk level value which is 75. Then we maintain per risk level by 75 compared to another 
risk level. That is how we can get risk tolerance levels from impact and likelihood scores, and finally, 
the risk level can find out for the specific control absent.   
5.6.1.8.2 Determine Impact 
53 
 
Basically, the impact is the magnitude of harm that can be expected to result from the consequences 
of unauthorized disclosure of information, unauthorized modification of information, unauthorized 
destruction of information, or loss of information or information system availability (Swanson et al., 
2010). With respect to security, the effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, or the of loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information or a system (NIST, 2018). As like (CSA, 2019), we have used CIA (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability) principal keys as one of the criteria for determining the impact of CSCD risk assessment. 
In NIST Cybersecurity Framework, the impact criteria are defined upon the Cybersecurity spectrum 
(Barrett, 2018). 
 
Figure 17: Information security model, the CIA triad (Al-Far et al., 2019) 
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the concept of ensuring that information is accessible for reading, 
listening, recording, or physical removal only to subjects entitled to it and that subjects only read or 
listens to the information to the extent permitted (Hammer & Schneider, 2007). 
 
Integrity:  Integrity refers to protecting information from being modified by unauthorized parties 
(NCES, 1998). According to (Cawthra et al., 2020), integrity is identifying, protecting, and responding 
to cyber threats and other destructive events. Maintaining adequate cybersecurity is crucial for a 
firm to maintain the integrity of its external and internal data, as well as to protect the firm’s 
strategic proprietary information. Sharing cybersecurity-related information could also have impact 
on a firm’s competitiveness on a particular market space (Gordon et al., 2015).  
 
Availability: It means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information (Cawthra et al., 
2020) 
Apart from CIA, we have also included strategic and cross-level impact criteria.    
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Strategic Impact: Cyber vulnerabilities undermine confidence in strategic systems; they increase 
uncertainty in information and analysis, impacting the credibility of deterrence and strategic stability 
(Unal, 2019). The author also emphasizes that loss of trust in technology also has implications for 
attribution and strategic calculus in crisis decision-making and may increase the risk of 
misperception. Cybersecurity is not only creating an impact on IT asset but also have overall impact 
business. An organization's security strategy must be aligned with business strategy and integral to 
the senior leadership's decision-making process to ensure that risk is managed appropriately so 
organizations operate safely in the contemporary threat landscape (James, 2018). Moreover, in one 
study, 95% of business leaders acknowledged cyber-security as being an area of high importance, but 
45% had no formal strategy in place around this  (James, 2018). Organizations should rethink their 
approach to cyber-security now to protect shareholder interests and avoid upcoming sanctions 
(James, 2018). As digital technologies are strategically aligned with business strategy, the same 
should be done with cybersecurity (Spremić & Šimunic, 2018).  
 
According to (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) strategic assets are resource and capability which are 
scarce, uneasily traded, inimitable, durable and can be used to convert the value become profit. The 
strategic assets’ characteristics imply that sources of sustainable competitive advantage are often 
related to intangible resources (Kyengo & Kilika, 2017). Intangible resources, also named knowledge, 
invisible assets, absorptive capabilities (Foss & Knudsen, 2003), core competencies, strategic assets, 
core capabilities (Galbreath, 2005), intellectual property rights, trademarks, information technology 
such as databases, networks, and skills such as capabilities and competencies(Lopez, 2001). 
(Bornemann & Leitner, 2002), observes that technology accumulated consumer information, brand 
name, reputation, and corporate culture are intangible assets that are invaluable to the firm’s 
competitive power and also the only real source of competitive edge that can be sustained over 
time. Based on all the above references, we add new strategic impact in the criteria for measuring 
full impact score in risk assessment where disruption of achieving the strategic objective, 
competitiveness, sustain value, quality, and excellence are the main key elements. 
 
Cross Level Impact: Multinational corporations (MNCs) want to locate their facilities in regions with 
characteristics that best suit their needs where the primary consideration is economic cost 
minimization (Escalante & Maier-Speredelozzi, 2008).  This author (Lse et al., 2019) explains how and 
why multinational corporations have global footprints. Hence, one of the manifestations of the 
increasing diversity in multinational corporation (MNC) operations is the growing importance of 
regional headquarters (RHQs). RHQs assume an intermediary, bridging role between the corporate 
headquarters and local affiliates and other actors in their respective regions (Commission & Affairs, 
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2006). We also get a strong idea from this author about the cross-level location of MNC, which are 
departmental, organizational, regional, national, and Global. 
 
On the other hand (CSA, 2019) considers national, organizational, and individual criteria for 
determining impact. From a large corporation’s perspective, the effect can happen at different levels 
like departmental or regional levels. That is why we consider cross-level criteria with varying levels of 
layering according to the location model to identify a more accurate impact for CSCD. These cross-
level criteria are Individual, Department, Branch, Region, National, Global, and Organizational. 
 
Impact detection criteria and respective rating values are bellowed. 
 
Impact  Criteria Confidentiality Integrity  Availability Strategic Cross Level 
Impact Rating 













































































































































































































Table 10: CSCD Impact criteria (CSA, 2019) (Cronin, 2018), (Thayer et al., 2013) 
5.6.1.8.3 Determine Likelihood 
Risk likelihood is the measurement metric of the historical or expected occurrence of an event (CSA, 
2019). The degree to which a threat is expected to create an impact which stated in terms of 
frequency, foreseeability, or probability (Cronin, 2018). To determine the likelihood of an undesired 
state, the possible reasons for its occurrence have to be assessed regarding issues like the probability 
of accidents or regarding cyberattack know-how, equipment, vulnerabilities of the target, and so on 
(Kiesling et al., 2016). For measuring the dynamic nature of cybersecurity threats, we will use a 
likelihood measurement system. In this research, we use the following factors to identify CSCD risk 
likelihood. 
Discoverability - How easy would an adversary be able to discover the vulnerability of an asset? This 
is dependent on the availability of information about the vulnerability and the exposure of the 
vulnerable asset (CSA, 2019). 
Exploitability - How easy would an adversary exploit the vulnerability of an asset? This is dependent 
on the access rights, complexity of tools, as well as technical skills required to carry out the attack 
(CSA, 2019). 
Reproducibility - How easy would an adversary be able to reproduce the attack on the asset? This is 
dependent on the complexity of the exploit customization and the environmental conditions 




Likelihood Criteria Reproducibility Exploitability Discoverability 
Likelihood Rating 
High Likely (5)  Attack can occur 
anytime. 
 Less possible to detect 
attack/threat by CTI based on 
OCM level. 
 Very easily exploit the 
vulnerability to the IT asset. 
 Not discovered 
vulnerability 
Likely (4)  Attack can usually 
occur. 
 Limited possibility to detect 
attack/threat by CTI based on 
OCM level. 
 Easily exploit the vulnerability 
to the IT asset. 
 Few parts of 
vulnerabilities are 
discovered 
Possible (3)  Attack is expected 
to occur but not 
usually. 
 Reasonable possibility to 
detect attack/threat by CTI 
based on OCM level. 
 Moderately exploit the 
vulnerability to the IT asset. 
 Some parts of 
vulnerabilities are 
discovered 
Unlikely (2)  Attack is 
foreseeable to 
occur but not 
repetitively. 
 Advance possibility to detect 
attack/threat by CTI based on 
OCM level. 
 Limitedly exploit the 
vulnerability to the IT asset. 
 Most parts of 
vulnerabilities are 
discovered 
Rare (1)  Attack is not 
Foreseeable to 
occur. 
 High possibility to detect 
attack/threat by CTI based on 
OCM level. 
 Very limitedly exploit the 
vulnerability to the IT asset. 




 Table 11: Likelihood criteria (CSA, 2019) (Cronin, 2018) (Thayer et al., 2013) 
  5.7 CSCD CONTROL BASELINE 
In this part, the CSCD control guideline will be presented. Based upon the defined criteria above, we 
have designed control based like according to parent control family. As the controls of each family 
are aligned and mapped from the different frameworks, it will be easy for enterprises to implement 
CSCD control along with strategic planning to safeguard IT assets. 
5.7.1. Security Strategy and Planning Control Family 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
1.1 Strategic 
assets 
N/A Basic Develop and Maintain SECURITY 
PLANNING POLICY AND 
PROCEDURES 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 






Identify Basic Develop and Maintain SYSTEM 
SECURITY PLAN 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
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  3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
1.3 Organizational 
Asset 
N/A Basic COORDINATE WITH OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
ENTITIES 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
1.4 All Identify Basic Develops an information 
security architecture for the 
information system 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
1.5 Non-IT Asset N/A Basic Structure of security roles and 
responsible item is regularly 
reviewed and revised, based on 
changes and/or past incidents. 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




 Table 12: Security Strategy and Planning Control Family 
5.7.2 Policy, Business Continuity, and compliance 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
2.1 Strategic 
assets 
Identify Industry standard Set a high level security policy 1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
2.2 Strategic 
assets 
Identify Industry standard Set detailed information 
security policies 
for critical assets and business 
processes. 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





Identify Industry standard Review the information 
security/Cybersecurity  policies 
periodically 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
2.4 User N/A Basic Make all personnel aware of the 
security 
policy and what it entails for 
their work. 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
Strategic 
assets 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
2.5 User Identify Basic Perform background 
checks/screening for key 
personnel 
and external contractors, when 
needed and legally permit 
ted. 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
2.6 User Identify Industry standard Set up a policy and procedure 
for background checks. 










N/A Basic Review and update 
policy/procedures for 
background 
checks and reference checks at 
regular intervals, taking into 
account changes and past 
incidents. 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
2.8 Non-IT Asset Identify Basic Conflicting duties and areas of 
responsibility should be 
segregated to reduce 
opportunities for 
unauthorized or unintentional 
modification or misuse of the 
organization’s assets. 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
2.9 IT Hardware Identify Industry standard A policy and supporting security 
measures should be adopted to 
manage the risks introduced by 
using 
mobile devices. 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
Strategic 
assets 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 2.10 
  
User Identify Basic A policy and supporting security 
measures should be 
implemented to protect 
information accessed, 
processed or stored at 
teleworking sites. 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
Strategic 
assets 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
 Table 13: Policy, Business Continuity, and compliance Control Family 
5.7.3. Hardware Asset Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
3.1 IT Hardware Identify Basic Maintain Detailed Asset 
Inventory of Physical devices 
and systems 
within the organization. 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.2 IT Hardware Identify Basic Maintain Asset Inventory 
Information 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.3 IT Hardware Identify Basic External information systems 
are catalogued 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.4 IT Hardware Identify Basic Resources (e.g., hardware, 
devices, data, time, personnel, 
and 
software) are prioritized based 
on their 
classification, criticality, and 
1 - Micro to Small 1 





3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.5 IT Hardware Identify Basic Utilize discovery tool for active 
and passive asset 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.6 IT Hardware Identify Basic Use DHCP Logging to 
Update Asset Inventory 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.7 IT Hardware Respond Basic Address Unauthorized 
Assets 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
3.8 IT Hardware Protect Basic Deploy Port Level Access 
Control 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3.9 IT Hardware Protect Basic Utilize Client Certificates 
Authentication mechanism 
Hardware Assets 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3.10 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Maintain Alternate Storage Site 
and Separation from Primary 
Site 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
3.11 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Alternate Processing Site 3 - Medium to Large 3 
  4 - Large to Super Large 3 
3.12 IT Hardware Protect State of the art   Separate Storage for Critical 
Information 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3.13 
  
IT Hardware Protect State of the art Protect power equipment and 
power cabling 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
3.14 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Maintain Redundant Cabling 3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
3.15 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Maitain Automatic Voltage 
Controls 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
3.16 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Emergency Shutoff 2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
3.17 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Emergency Power 1 - Micro to Small 3 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
61 
 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3.18 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Ensure Alternate Power Supply 
for Minimal Operational 
Capability 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3.19 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Emergency Lighting 3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
3.20 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Protect Against Unauthorized 
Physical Connections 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
 
 Table 14: Hardware Asset Management Control Family 
5.7.4. Software Asset Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 









1 - Micro to Small 1 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
IT Platform 3 - Medium to Large 1 




Identify Basic Ensure Software 
update and support 
by Vendor 




2 - Small to Medium 2 
IT Platform 3 - Medium to Large 4 





Identify Basic Utilize Software 
Inventory Tools 










Identify Basic Track Software 
Inventory 
Information 














Identify Basic Integrate Software 
and Hardware Asset 
Inventories 




4 - Large to Super Large 1 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
IT Services 1 












2 - Small to Medium 5 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
3 - Medium to Large 5 





Protect Basic Utilize Application 
Whitelisting 
Technology 









































Protect Basic Physically or 
Logically 
Segregate High Risk 
Applications 













Protect Industry standard Restriction on 
Software usuage 




2 - Small to Medium 1 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





Protect State of the art Use Automatic 
mechanisms for 
software updates 




3 - Medium to Large 2 





Detect State of the art Maintain notification 
Before or After 
update Softeware or 
OS 




3 - Medium to Large 3 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
IT Services 
IT Platform 
4.14 IT Hardware Protect State of the art (IoT specific control): 
Verify the 
authenticity and 
integrity of each 
update via a trust 
relationship  




3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
 
 Table 15: Software Asset Management Control Family 
5.7.5. Vulnerability Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
 





Detect Basic Identify and 
Document Asset 
Vulnerability 


















































4 - Large to Super Large 1 




1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





Protect Basic Utilize Automated 
Software Patch 
Management Tools 





2 - Small to Medium 1 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
3 - Medium to Large 2 







Respond Basic Compare Back-to-
Back 
Vulnerability Scans 
















Identify Industry standard Subscribe to 
vulnerability 
intelligence services  











 Table 16: Vulnerability Management Control Family 
5.7.6. Privileged Accounts Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 




3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
6.2 User Identify Basic Define Group and 
role Membership 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
6.3 User Protect Industry standard 
  
Maintain Automatic 
and dynamic System 
of Account 
Management 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
6.4 User Protect Basic Change Default 
Password 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 




1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.6 User Protect Basic Use Unique 
Passwords 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
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3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.7 User Protect Basic Use Multi-Factor 
Authentication for All 
Administrative 
Access 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.8 User Protect Basic Use Dedicated 
Workstations For All 
Administrative Tasks 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.9 User Protect Basic Limit Access to 
Scripting 
Tools 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.10 User Detect Basic Log and Alert 
on Changes to 
Administrative Group 
Membership 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 





3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.12 User Detect Industry standard Automate Account 
Management Audit 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
6.13 User Detect Industry standard Establish Priviledge 
Accounts Monitoring 
process 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
  4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.14 User Protect Industry standard Establish Role Based 
Access Control 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
6.15 User Protect Industry standard Review of User 
Privileges 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
6.16 User Protect Industry standard Enforce Limit of 
Unsuccessful Logon 
Attempts 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
6.17 User Protect Industry standard Maintain System 
Notification 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
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4 - Large to Super Large 2 
6.18 User Respond Industry standard Block access to a 
machine (either 




2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
 
Table 15: Privileged Accounts Management Control Family 
5.7.7. Identity, Access, and Authentication Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 




3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
7.2 User Protect Industry standard Maintain Automatic  
and dynamic System 
of Account 
Management 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 




3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
7.4 User Protect State of the art Utilize Multi-Factor 
Authentication 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.5 User Protect Industry standard Encrypt or Hash 
All Authentication 
Credentials 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.6 User Protect Industry standard Encrypt Transmittel 
of Username and 
Authentication 
Credentials 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.7 User Identify Industry standard Maintain an 
Inventory of 
Accounts 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
7.8 User Protect Industry standard Establish Process for 
Revoking Access 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
7.9 User Respond Industry standard Disable Any 
Unassociated 
Accounts 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.10 User Respond Industry standard Maintain Disable  
Accounts policy 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
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2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.11 User Protect Basic Ensure All Accounts 
Have 
An Expiration Date 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.12 User Protect Basic Lock Workstation 
Sessions After 
Inactivity 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
7.13 User Detect Industry standard Monitor Attempts to 
Access Deactivated 
Accounts 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
7.14 User Detect Industry standard Alert on Account 
Login 
Behavior Deviation 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 









1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.17 User Protect Basic Remote access is 
managed 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.18 User Protect Industry standard  Monitoring and 
Control of Remote 
Access 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.19 User Protect Industry standard Authorize Privileged 
Commands and 
Access of Remote 
Access 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 





the principles of least 
privilege and 
separation of duties 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 















7.22 User Detect State of the art Automate Account 
Management Audit 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.23 User Protect State of the art Establish Dynamic 
Priviledge 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
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Management 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.24 User Protect Industry standard Establish Role Based 
Access Control 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
User Protect Industry standard Restrict Access to 
Specific Information 
Types 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
7.25 3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.26 User Protect Industry standard Maintain Domain 
Authentication 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.27 User Protect Industry standard Maintain Least 
Privilege 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.28 User Protect Industry standard Review of User 
Privileges 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.29 User Protect Basic Enforce Limit of 
Unsuccessful Logon 
Attempts 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.30 User Protect Industry standard Maintain System 
Notification 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.31 User Protect Industry standard Limit Concurrent 
Session 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.32 User Protect Industry standard Employ envryption 
for Mobile Device to 
Control Access 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.33 IT Hardware Protect Basic Restricted Use of 
Non-organizationally 
Owned and Portable 
Storage Devices  
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.34 User Protect State of the art Maintain Single Sign-
on 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
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7.35 User Protect Industry standard Dynamic Address 
Allocation 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
7.36 User Protect Basic Maintain Password-
based Authentication 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
7.37 User Protect State of the art Maintain Public Key-
based Authentication 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
  
 7.38 
User Protect State of the art Maintain token-
based Authentication 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.39 User Protect Industry standard Bind identities and 
authenticators 
dynamically 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 




2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 




2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
7.42 User Protect Basic Restrict Publicly 
Accecible Content 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.43 User Protect State of the art Cross Organizational 
Credential 
Management 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
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7.44 User Protect Industry standard Maintain strong 
password policy 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.45 
  
User Detect Industry standard Monitor access to 
network and in 
formation systems, 
have a process 
for approving 
exceptions and regis 
tering access 
violations 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
7.46 Strategic assets Identify Industry standard Evaluate the 
effectiveness of 
access 
control policies and 
procedures and 
implement cross 
checks on access 
control mechanisms. 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
7.47 User Protect State of the art For Bigdata 
Perspective: Use 
trusted certificates 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
      4 - Large to Super Large 4 
7.48 User Protect Industry standard For Cloud 
Perspective:  
automatically update 
access control lists 
(ACLs) or traffic flow 
policies  
1 - Micro to Small 4 










access control lists 






3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
3 - Medium to Large 3 




User Protect State of the art  Dual Authorization 
for Deletion or 
Destruction 
2 - Small to Medium 4 




User Protect State of the art  Dual Authorization 
for Deletion or 
Destruction 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
 
 Table 17: Identity, Access, and Authentication Management Control Family 
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5.7.8. Configuration Management (Hardware, Software, Mobile device, laptop, 
Workstation, servers, IoT, etc.) 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 




Protect Basic Establish Secure 
Configurations 
1 - Micro to Small 2 




3 - Medium to Large 5 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 





Protect Industry standard Maintain Secure 
Images 












Protect Industry standard Securely Store 
Master 
Images 




























Detect Industry standard Implement 
Automated 
Configuration 















Detect Industry standard Utilize file integrity 
checking tools  








4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
Table 18: Configuration Management Control Family 
5.7.9. Maintenance, Monitoring, and Log Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 









Code/Application) 4 - Large to Super Large 4 
IT Platform 
9.2 IT Hardware 
Detect Basic 
Activate Audit 
Logging 2 - Small to Medium 1 
IT Services 




4 - Large to Super Large 2 
9.3 IT Hardware 
Detect Basic 
Enable Detailed 
Logging 3 - Medium to Large 2 
IT Services 





9.4 IT Hardware 
Detect Basic 
Ensure Adequate 
Storage for Logs 3 - Medium to Large 2 
IT Services 
IT Platform 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
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9.5 IT Hardware 
Detect Industry standard 
Central Log 




Code/Application) 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
IT Platform 







Deploy SIEM or Log 
Analytic Tools 














Code/Application) 4 - Large to Super Large 4 
IT Platform 









Reporting Logs and 
notifications 









4 - Large to Super Large 1 IT Services 
IT Platform 





Regularly Tune SIEM 











9.9 IT Hardware 
Protect Industry standard 
 Store on Separate 





















3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
9.11 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard  Monitoring Physical 2 - Small to Medium 3 
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Access to Systems 3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 




1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
9.13 Strategic assets 
Identify Basic 
Develop a log 
retention policy to 
make sure that the 
logs are kept for a 
sufficient period of 
time. 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
9.14 Data 
Identify Industry standard 
 For Bigdata 
Perspective:  Mine 
logging events 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
9.15 IT Services 
Protect 





should support API 
security and tenant 
isolation of 
VMs/containers 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
  3 - Medium to Large 5 
  4 - Large to Super Large 5 
9.15 IT Services 






2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
9.16 IT Services 




2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
  
 Table 19: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Log Management Control Family 
5.7.10. Email, Browser, and Web Protections 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 




Protect Basic Ensure that only 
fully supported web 
browsers 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 4 








Email Client Plugins 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 






Protect Industry standard Limit Use of 
Scripting 
Languages in Web 
Browsers and Email 
Clients 
3 - Medium to Large 3 








3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 




Protect Industry standard Subscribe to URL 
Categorization 
Service 
3 - Medium to Large 4 




Detect Industry standard Log All URL 
Requests 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




Protect State of the art Use of DNS Filtering 
Services 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
IT Hardware 3 - Medium to Large 2 









3 - Medium to Large 4 
IT Hardware 4 - Large to Super Large 4 
10.9 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Block Unnecessary 
File 
Types 








Protect Industry standard Sandbox All Email 
Attachments 





Detect State of the art Activity monitoring   4 - Large to Super Large 5 
IT Hardware 










1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
Protect 3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
 
Table 20: Email, Browser, and Web Protections Control Family 
5.7.11. Malware Defense Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
11.1 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Utilize Centrally 
Managed Anti-
Malware 







IT Services 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
IT Platform 








2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 






3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 





1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
11.5 IT Hardware Protect Basic Configure Devices to 
Not 
Auto-Run Content 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
11.6 IT Hardware Detect Industry standard Centralize Anti-
Malware 
Logging 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
11.7 IT Hardware Detect State of the art Enable DNS Query 
Logging 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
State of the art Enable Command-
Line 
Audit Logging 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
11.8 IT Hardware Detect Core Unauthorized mobile 
code, OTP, Token are 
detected 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
11.9 IT Services Detect Basic Scan email and filter 
webcontent 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
11.10 
  
Data Protect Industry standard Enable anti-
exploitation features  
3 - Medium to Large 2 







Identify State of the art Use network-based 
anti-malware tools to 
identify executables 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 




process that allows 
the IT support 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




to supply the security 
team with samples of 
malware  
 
Table 21: Malware Defense Management 
5.7.12. Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 





3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
12.2 IT Hardware Protect Basic Ensure Only 
Approved 
Ports, Protocols, and 
Services Are 
Running 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
12.3 IT Hardware Detect Basic Perform Regular 
Automated Port 
Scans 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
12.4 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Apply Host-Based 
Firewalls or Port-
Filtering 
1 - Micro to Small 3 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
12.5 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Implement 
Application 
Firewalls 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
12.6 IT Hardware Detect Industry standard Verify any server 
that is visible from 
the Internet or an 
untrusted 
network 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
Data 1 
12.7 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Operate critical 
services on separate 
physical or logical 
host machines 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 4 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
12.8 IT Services Protect State of the art For Cloud 
Perspective: limit 
the maximum traffic 
of the management 
network 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
 Documentation of 
business 
justification and 
approval for use of 
all 
services, protocols, 




2 - Small to Medium 1 
12.9  Strategic assets Identify Basic 3 - Medium to Large 1 







considered to be 
insecure 
12.10 IT Hardware Protect State of the art  Implement a DMZ 
to limit 







2 - Small to Medium 4 
Data 3 - Medium to Large 4 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
IT Services 1 
12.11 IT Hardware Respond State of the art Implement anti-
spoofing 
measures to detect 
and block forged 
source IP addresses 
from entering the 
network. 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
12.12 User Protect Basic Always change 
vendor-supplied 




installing a system 
on the network 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 

















3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Services 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
IT Platform 5 
 
Table 22: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services Control Family 
5.7.13. Network Device Security (Firewall, Routers, Switch and etc.) 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
13.1 IT Hardware Identify Industry standard Maintain Standard 
Security 
Configurations 
for Network Devices 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.2 IT Hardware Identify Basic Document Traffic 
Configuration Rules 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 






3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.4 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Install the Latest 
Stable 
Version of Any 
1 - Micro to Small 5 




Related Updates on 
All 
Network Devices 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.5 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Manage Network 





3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.6 IT Hardware Protect Basic Use Dedicated 




3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 




3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.8 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Secure and 
synchronize router 
configuration files. 
1 - Micro to Small 3 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
13.9 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Install perimeter 
firewalls 
2 - Small to Medium 4 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
 
Table 23: Network Device Security (Firewall, Routers, Switch and etc.) Control Family 
5.7.14. Network Defense 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication 
Level 
Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
14.1 IT Hardware Identify Basic Maintain an Inventory of 
Network Boundaries 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 




3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.3 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Deny Communications 
With Known Malicious IP 
Addresses 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
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14.4. IT Hardware Protect State of the art Deny Communication 
Over Unauthorized Ports 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.5 IT Hardware Detect State of the art Configure Monitoring 
Systems to Record 
Network Packets 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.6 IT Hardware Detect State of the art Deploy Network-Based 
IDS Sensors 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
14.7 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Deploy Network-Based 
Intrusion Prevention 
Systems 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 




3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.9 IT Hardware Detect State of the art Deploy Application Layer 
Filtering Proxy Server 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.10 IT Hardware Detect State of the art Decrypt Network Traffic 
at Proxy 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.11 User Detect State of the art Require All Remote 
Logins to Use Multi 
Factor Authentication 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.12 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Manage All Devices 
Remotely Logging Into 
Internal Network 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.13 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Segment the Network 
Based on Sensitivity 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.14 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Disable Workstation 
to-Workstation 
Communication 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.15 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Enable Firewall Filtering 
Between VLANs 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.16 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Restrict Ability to Attack 
Other Systems 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.17 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Detection and Monitoring 2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.18 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Maintain Networked 
Privileged Accesses 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Services 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.19 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Block Communication from 
Non-organizationally 
Configured Hosts 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
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IT Services 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.20 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Separate Subnets for 
Connecting to Different 
Security Domains 
1 - Micro to Small 4 
IT Services 2 - Small to Medium 4 
IT Platform 3 - Medium to Large 4 
Data 4 - Large to Super Large 4 
14.21 IT Services Protect Industry standard Disable Sender Feedback on 
Protocol Validation Failure 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
User 3 - Medium to Large 3 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 3 
14.22 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Allow DMZ systems to 
communicate with private 
network 
systems 
3 - Medium to Large 4 




Protect State of the art Make sure software of 
network and 
information systems is not 
tampered with or altered, for 
instance 
by using input controls. 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Platform 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.24 
  
IT Hardware Protect State of the art For Bigdata Perspective: Use 




3 - Medium to Large 5 
IT Services 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.25 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Secure isolation of multi-
tenant network services is 
required 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
IT Services 2 - Small to Medium 5 
IT Platform 3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.26 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Design the network using a 
minimum of a three-tier 
architecture (DMZ, 
middleware, and private 
network).  
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.27 IT Hardware Respond Industry standard Rapid response and shunning 
of detected attacks 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
14.28 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Deploy domain name systems 
(DNS) in a hierarchical, 
structured fashion 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
14.29 
  
IT Hardware Protect State of the art Segment the enterprise 
network into multiple, 
separate trust zones 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




Table 24: Network Defense Control Family 
5.7.15. Wireless Access Control 
After analyzing numbers of scientific research paper and CSCD control frameworks from here 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
15.1 IT Hardware Identify Basic Maintain an Inventory 
of Authorized Wireless 
Access Points 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
15.2 IT Hardware Detect Basic Detect Wireless Access 
Points Connected to the 
Wired Network 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
15.3 IT Hardware Detect Industry standard Use a Wireless Intrusion 
Detection System 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
15.4 IT Hardware Protect Basic Disable Wireless Access 
on Devices if Not 
Required 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
15.5 IT Hardware Protect Basic Limit Wireless Access on 
Client Devices 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
15.6 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Disable Peer-to-Peer 
Wireless Network 
Capabilities on Wireless 
Clients 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
15.7 IT Hardware Protect State of the art Leverage the Advanced 
Encryption Standard 
(AES) to Encrypt Wireless 
Data 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
15.8 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Use Wireless 
Authentication 
Protocols That Require 
Mutual, Multi-Factor 
Authentication 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
15.9 IT Hardware Protect Basic Disable Wireless 
Peripheral Access to 
Devices 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
15.10 IT Hardware Protect Basic Create Separate Wireless 
Network for Personal 
and Untrusted Devices 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
15.11 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Restrict Configurations by 
Users 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
15.12 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Ensure that each wireless 
device connected to the 
network matches an 
authorized configuration and 
security profile 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
15.13 IT Hardware Protect Industry standard Install personal firewall 
software or 
equivalent functionality on any 
portable 
computing devices 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




Table 25: Wireless Access Control 
5.7.16. Data Protection, Recovery, and Backup 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
16.1 Data Identify Basic Maintain an Inventory of 
Sensitive Information 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
16.2 Data Protect Basic Remove Sensitive 
Data or Systems Not 
Regularly Accessed by 
Organization 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.3 Data Detect State of the art Monitor and Block 
Unauthorized Network 
Traffic 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.4 Data Protect Basic Only Allow Access 
to Authorized Cloud 
Storage or Email 
Providers 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.5 Data Detect State of the art Monitor and Detect Any 
Unauthorized Use of 
Encryption 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.6 Data Protect Industry standard Encrypt Mobile Device 
Data 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
16.7 Data Protect Basic Manage USB Devices 3 - Medium to Large 4 
IT Hardware 4 - Large to Super Large 5 




4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.9 Data Protect Basic Encrypt Data on USB 
Storage Devices 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
16.10 Data Protect State of the art Encrypt All Sensitive 
Information in Transit 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.11 Data Detect State of the art Utilize an Active 
Discovery Tool to 
Identify Sensitive Data 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.12 Data Protect State of the art Protect Information 
Through Access Control 
Lists 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.13 Data Protect Industry standard Enforce Access Control 
to Data Through 
Automated Tools 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.14 Data Protect State of the art Encrypt all sensitive 
information at rest using a 
tool that requires a secondary 




16.15 Data Detect Industry standard Enforce Detail Logging 
for Access or Changes to 
Sensitive Data 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
16.16 Data Protect State of the art ENFORCE PHYSICAL / LOGICAL 
SEPARATION OF 
INFORMATION FLOWS 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.17 Data Protect State of the art For IoT Perspective  Encript 
user data 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.18 Data Protect State of the art Ensure that each system is 
automatically backed up 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.19 Data Protect Industry standard Test data on backup media on 
a regular basis 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.20 Data Protect Industry standard Ensure that key systems have 
at least one backup 
destination that is not 
continuously addressable 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.21 
  
Data Protect State of the art For Bigdata Perspective : 
Prevent information leakage 
through output 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.22 
  
Data Protect State of the art For Bigdata Perspective: 
Ensure data replication 
consistency 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.23 Data Protect Industry standard For Bigdata Perspective: Utilize 
policy-based encryption 
system (PBES7) 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
16.24 Data Recover State of the art Implement mediated 
decryption system 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.25 Data Protect Industry standard For Bigdata Perspective: Limit 
features of homomorphic 
encryption for 
practical implementation 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
16.26 Data Protect State of the art For Bigdata Perspective: Utilize 
attribute-based encryption and 
access control 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.27 Data Protect State of the art For Cloud Perspective: User 
data on different VMs is 
isolated at the virtualization  
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
16.28 Data Protect Industry standard Separate Physical or Logical 
flow of Information  
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
16.29 Data Protect State of the art Validation of Metadata 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
16.30 Data Detect Industry standard   Sanitize Data 4 - Large to Super Large 4 
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16.31 Data Protect Industry standard Perform Complete 
System Backups 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.32 Data Protect Industry standard Test Data on Backup Media 2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
16.33 Data Protect Industry standard Protect Backups 1 - Micro to Small 3 
2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
16.34 Data Protect Industry standard Ensure All Backups Have 
at Least One Offline 
Backup Destination 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 3 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
Table 26: Data Protection, Recovery, and Backup Control Family 
5.7.17. Application Software Security 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
17.1 Software 
(Executable 
Code/Application) Protect Industry standard 
Establish Secure Coding 
Practices 3 - Medium to Large 3 
User 4 - Large to Super Large 5 
17.2 Software 
(Executable 
Code/Application) Identify Industry standard 
Ensure That Explicit Error 
Checking Is Performed 
for All In-House 
Developed Software 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




Identify Industry standard 
Verify That Acquired 
Software Is Still 
Supported 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
Software (Non-
Executable 







N/A Industry standard 
Only Use Up-to-Date 
and Trusted Third-Party 
Components 










N/A Basic Use only Standardized 
and Extensively 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
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Are Trained in Secure 
Coding 
3 - Medium to Large 2 




N/A State of the art 
Apply Static and Dynamic 




4 - Large to Super Large 2 
17.8 Strategic assets 
N/A Industry standard 
Establish a Process to 
Accept and Address 
Reports of Software 
Vulnerabilities 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
17.9 IT Platform 
N/A Industry standard 
Separate Production and 
Non-Production Systems 3 - Medium to Large 3 




N/A State of the art 
Deploy Web Application 
Firewalls 3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
17.11 Data 
N/A Industry standard 
Use Standard Hardening 
Configuration Templates 
for Databases 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 3 
17.12 Software 
(Executable 
Code/Application) Protect Basic 
Restriction usage of Open-
source Software 3 - Medium to Large 3 





Code/Application) Protect Basic 
User-installed Software 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





Code/Application) Protect State of the art 
 Automated Enforcement and 
Monitoring 3 - Medium to Large 3 






Protect State of the art 
Dynamic Code Analysis 








Protect State of the art 
Interactive Application Security 








Protect State of the art 
Security and Privacy Tracking 
Tools for Development 
Process, Standards, and Tools 











Protect State of the art 
Automated Vulnerability 
Analysis for Development 
Process, Standards, and Tools  










Identify Industry standard 
 Structure for Testing  




3 - Medium to Large 2 




Protect State of the art 
Perform regular scanning for 
unauthorized software and 
generate alerts when it 
is discovered on a system. 
















Stop displaying system error 
messages to end-users 1 - Micro to Small 2 
IT Platform 2 - Small to Medium 2 
IT Services 3 - Medium to Large 3 






Protect Industry standard 
Examine the product security 










2 - Small to Medium 2 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 3 - Medium to Large 3 
IT Services 
4 - Large to Super Large 
3 







Protect Industry standard 
Use standard hardening 
configuration 
templates for DB 








3 - Medium to Large 3 
Software (Virtual 
Equipment) 4 - Large to Super Large 
4 
IT Services 1 
17.24 Data 
Protect State of the art 
For Bigdata Perspective: 
:Maintain worker nodes 1 - Micro to Small 2 




3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
17.25 Data 
Detect State of the art 
For Bigdata Perspective: 
Detect fake nodes 1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
 
 Table 27: Application Software Security control Control Family 
5.7.18. Risk Assessment and Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
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SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
 18.1 All Detect State of the art Use of All-source Intelligence 3 - Medium to Large 4 




User Protect State of the art Dynamic Threat Awareness 2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 18.3 
  
User Protect State of the art Predictive Cyber Analytics 3 - Medium to Large 2 





All Respond Industry standard Risk Response 1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
  
 18.5 
All Protect State of the art Establish and maintain a cyber 
threat hunting capability 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
18.6 Strategic assets Protect Industry standard Set up a risk management 
methodol 
ogy and/or tools based on 
industry 
standards. 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
18.7 Strategic assets Identify Basic Make key personnel aware of 
the main 
risks and how they are 
mitigated 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





Strategic assets Identify Industry standard Review the risk management 
methodology 
and/or tools, periodically, 
taking into ac 
count changes and past 
incidents 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
 Table 28: Risk Assessment and Management Control Family 
5.7.19. Incident Response and Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
19.1 Strategic assets N/A Basic Document Incident 
Response Policy and 
Procedures 
1 - Micro to Small 2 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
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3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.2 Non-IT Asset N/A Basic Assign Job Titles and 
Duties for Incident 
Response 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.3 Non-IT Asset N/A Basic Designate Management 
Personnel to Support 
Incident Handling 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.4 Strategic assets N/A Basic Devise Organization 
wide Standards For 
Reporting Incidents 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 




1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 




1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.7 N/A N/A Basic Conduct Periodic 
Incident Scenario 
Sessions for Personnel 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.8 Strategic assets N/A Basic Create Incident Scoring 
and Prioritization 
Schema 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.9 Non-IT Asset N/A Basic Alternate Communications 
Protocols 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
19.10 All Protect Industry standard Maintainf safe mode of 
operation 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.11 User Detect State of the art Behavior Analysis 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
19.12 All Respond Industry standard Automation Support for 
Availability of Information and 
Support in Incident Response 
Assistance 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
19.13 Strategic assets Protect Basic Coordination with External 
Providers in Incident Response 
Assistance  
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
 Table 29: Incident Response and Management Control Family 
5.7.20. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
20.1 All Detect Basic Establish a Penetration 1 - Micro to Small 3 
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Testing Program 2 - Small to Medium 3 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
20.2 All Detect Industry standard Conduct Regular 
External and Internal 
Penetration Tests 
3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
20.3 All Protect Industry standard Perform Periodic Red 
Team Exercises 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
20.4 All N/A Basic Include Tests for 
Presence of Unprotected 
System Information and 
Artifacts 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
20.5 All Identify Industry standard Create a Test Bed for 
Elements Not Typically 
Tested in Production 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
20.6 All Protect Industry standard Use Vulnerability 
Scanning and 
Penetration Testing Tools 
in Concert 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
20.7 Strategic assets N/A Basic Ensure Results From 




4 - Large to Super Large 2 
20.8 User Protect Basic Control and Monitor 
Accounts Associated 
With Penetration Testing 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
20.9 All Detect State of the art For Bigdata Perspective:  Apply 
fuzzing methods for security 
testing 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
20.10 All Detect Basic For Bigdata Perspective: 
Secure the system against Sybil 
attacks 
3 - Medium to Large 5 




 Table 30: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises Control Family 
5.7.21. Security Awareness and Training 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 
following sub controls data are collected and mapped in different criteria. 
SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
21.1 User N/A Industry standard Perform a Skills Gap 
Analysis 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
21.2  Strategic assets N/A Basic Deliver Training to Fill 
the Skills Gap 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.3 N/A N/A Basic Update Awareness 
Content Frequently 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 1 
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 21.4 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train Workforce on 
Secure Authentication 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.5 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train Workforce on 
Identifying Social 
Engineering Attacks 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.6 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train Workforce on 
Sensitive Data Handling 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
122.73 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.7 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train Workforce on 
Causes of Unintentional 
Data Exposure 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.8 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train Workforce 
Members on Identifying 
and Reporting Incidents 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 1 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.9 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train on Insider threat  3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.10 Strategic assets N/A Basic Train and make awareness on  
Suspicious Communications 
and Anomalous System 
Behavior 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 21.11 Strategic assets N/A Basic Conduct Role based security 
Traning and awareness on 
environmenr, security, 
communication, behavioural  
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
21.12 Strategic assets N/A Basic Simulated Events for Incident 
response traning 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
21.13 Strategic assets N/A Basic Validate and improve 
awareness levels through 
periodic tests 
2 - Small to Medium 2 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
 Table 31: Security Awareness and Training Control Family 
5.7.22. External Service Management 
After analyzing the number of scientific research papers and CSCD control frameworks from here, the 




SC No Asset Type CSCD Function Sophistication Level Sub Control (SC) RMM Level RL 
22.1 Strategic assets Identify Basic Maintain Risk Assessments and 
Organizational Approvals 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 





IT Hardware Identify Basic Identification of Functions, 
Ports, Protocols, and Services 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
22.3 Strategic assets Identify Basic Include security requirements 
and 
relevant tasks in contracts with 
third-parties and customers. 
1 - Micro to Small 1 
2 - Small to Medium 1 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
4 - Large to Super Large 2 
22.4 Non-IT Asset Identify Industry standard Define responsibility 1 - Micro to Small 3 
Strategic assets 2 - Small to Medium 3 
User 3 - Medium to Large 4 
4 - Large to Super Large 4 
22.5 Strategic assets Identify Basic Set and ensure a security 
policy for contracts 
with third-parties 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
Intangible assets 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
22.6 Strategic assets Identify Basic Review security policy for third 
par 
ties, following incidents or 
changes. 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
Intangible assets 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
22.7 All Protect Industry standard Perform risk analysis before 
entering any outsourcing 
agreement 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
22.8 All Detect Industry standard Keep track of security incidents 
related to or caused by third-
parties. 
1 - Micro to Small 5 
2 - Small to Medium 5 
3 - Medium to Large 5 
4 - Large to Super Large 5 
22.9 Intangible assets Identify Basic Periodically review and update 
policy for third parties and 
reevaluate outsourcing 
agreements at regular 
intervals, taking into account 
past incidents, changes, etc. 
3 - Medium to Large 2 
Non-IT Asset 4 - Large to Super Large 2 
 
 Table 32: External Service Management Control Family 
5.8 RISK LEVEL LANDSCAPE BASED ON RMM LEVEL 
Every type of RMM level enterprise has a different variation of risks. Organizations should 
understand the level of risks. In this part, we will illustrate the percentage of varying risk levels based 
on the RRM level. We used the total risk level value (R1,R2,R3,R4,R5) sum to illustrate the risk 
landscape of every parent control family. Then we represent the percentage of each risk level on the 
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total sum of the risk score. For the RMM level, we have done the same calculation to find out the risk 
landscape and Risk percentage level.  
5.8.1. Risk Level Landscape for Micro to Small Enterprise 
Here we have illustrated a risk landscape for Micro to small enterprises. If we observe the left figure, 
we can see high-risk control family is Application Software Security (ASS), where most of the sub 
controls are very high R5. Besides, Network Defense Security (NDS) control has the second most very 
high leveled risk. The identity, Access, and Authentication (IAA) control family has a high number of 
R4 level sub controls.  We can see more complexion of risk level illustration in right figure of a pie 
chart. According to the analyzed data, we have observed that about 57% of subcontrols are very risky 
and high risky for this type of organization. Without implementing these controls, enterprises can be 
at serious threat of cyber attack. Even day-to-day operation and business can be hampered 
significantly. For the detail of the Trigram name, Click here. 
  
 Figure 18: RL Landscape (Micro to Small),  Figure 19: RL Illustration (Micro to Small) 
5.8.2. Risk Level Landscape for Small to Medium Enterprise 
Risk level varies for small to Medium Enterprises. Here in the left figure, we can observe a significant 
number of risks associated with the Identity, Access, and Authentication (IAA) control family. Sub 
controls of this parent control family have topmost R4 control, which gives a clear indication the 
necessity of enforcing these controls for cyber resilience. MML, MDM, ND, DPR control family also 
contains a majority number of R5 risks. On the other hand, 66% of sub controls are identified as R5 
and R4 levels. That means two-third of controls are highly significant for the Small to Medium 
enterprise’s CSCD. According to the pie chart, it shows a clear increase in risk severity of sub controls 
for small to medium companies than micro to small. Medium level R3 category risk exists with 17% of 




     Figure 20: RL Landscape (Small to Medium),    Figure 21: RL Illustration (Small to Medium)  
5.8.3. Risk Level Landscape for Medium to Large Enterprise 
We have seen exciting changes for medium to large enterprise-level than previous ones. Though risk 
level seems to remain the same but the risk landscape provides the diversity of risk level for different 
parent control families. Interestingly, we observe the risk level score is high for IAA parent control, 
where the second most risky parent control is ND here. Having a very high R5 risk level score gives a 
clear indication about the severity level of subcontrols of this parent control family. Moreover, it is 
also observed that all parent control family contains more risk level score than previous RMM level. 
This is how we get the idea that medium to large enterprises has more specific controls than small to 
medium enterprises. Usually, this type of RMM level has more impact than lower-level enterprises. 
The absence of top risky controls can increase the risk of cyber-attacks and resilience. For the detail 
of the Trigram name, Click here. 
  
 Figure 22: RL Landscape (Medium to Large),  Figure 23: RL Illustration (Medium to Large)  
5.8.4. Risk Level Landscape for Large to Super Large Enterprise 
After analyzing data for large and Super large organizations control risk, we have got another diverse 
result. Here according to the second figure (Figure 6.8.3.2) 69% of sub controls are specified in R4 
and R5 level, which is high in nay RMM level enterprise. Importance of the CSCD control 
implementation pointing the high-risk impact on cybersecurity and business continuity. The overall 
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stability of a company can be under serious threat for just only lack of cybersecurity and cyber 
defense measure. However, we see IAA contains the highest risk level score where most of the 
controls are R4 level. The second-highest spot of parent control goes to DPR. ND contains a high 
number of R5 level risk controls. If we compare DPR with ND parent controls here, we see ND control 
has a high-risk levels (R5 and R4) here. Remarkably all parent controls contain a high-risk level score 
for large and super large enterprises. Maintaining operation continuation, cyber safety, and security, 
there is no alternative to implementing high-risk parent controls. For the detail of Trigram name, 
Click here 
  
     Figure 24: RL Landscape (Large to Super Large),  Figure 25: RL Illustration (Large to Super Large)  
5.9. OVERALL RISK LANDSCAPE ALL TYPES OF ENTERPRISES BASED ON RISK SCORE: 
In this part, the overall risk level score landscape of parent controls is illustrated based on RMM level 
enterprise. First of all, it is clearly indicated that IAA control family contains the most CSCD control 
for medium to large and Large to super large organizations. Nevertheless, we have observed a 
number of controls are much for ND, DPR, and ASS controls families for these RMM levels. If we look 
at small to medium maturity level enterprises, we see the importance of IAA still exists there with 
most controls. The micro to small maturity level companies' major CSCD control is ND. For the detail 





 Figure 26: Risk Score Landscape of parent controls based on RMM Level 
5.10. CSCD HIGH RISK PARENT CONTROL FAMILY LANDSCAPE BASED ON RMM LEVEL: 
After analyzing multiple aspects of risks for inactive controls, here we get overall risk score of all 
parent controls based on RMM level enterprises. We represent data according to high-risk control to 
low-risk control families. Thus, it will be easily understood about the top risky controls of a specific 
type of organization. We can see diverse results about top risky controls in the following table. For A-
level organization’s most risky control family is ASS. That means the inactivity of this control will 
create severe risk for that type of organization. Hence, MML controls are less risky controls in this 
family. On the other side, risky top control is changed in small to medium-level organizations. In this 
RMM category, IAA , LCN, DPR, ND, and MDM are the top five high-risk control families. VM 
management is considered a low priority control in this type of organization.  
For the medium to large and large to super large RMM type enterprises have most of the controls. 
Even we have observed fluctuation of risk score there. Both RMM level organization type has same 
high-risk controls of IAA family but second risky control gets changed to ND in C level companies 
whereas DPR contains second risk level score for D level companies. In terms of risk score, we have 
observed less fluctuation between these two types RMM category, but for a specific control, 
sometimes fluctuation gets higher than A level to D level company based upon the CSCD capability. 
The bottom two fewer controls families remain the same in C and D level RMM enterprises.  
For the detail of Trigram name, Click here 
SL Micro to Small (A) Small to Medium (B) Medium to Large (C) Large to Super Large (D) 
Tri Name RL Score Tri Name RL Score Tri Name RL Score Tri Name RL Score 
1 ASS 33 IAA 66 IAA 146 IAA 158 
2 ND 28 LCN 35 ND 100 DPR 133 
3 IAA 25 DPR 34 DPR 81 ND 125 
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4 MDM 19 ND 32 ASS 71 ASS 88 
5 DPR 19 MDM 25 HAM 54 HAM 58 
6 LCN 13 MML 23 MDM 53 PAM 58 
7 PAM 12 PAM 22 PAM 51 LCN 58 
8 SAM 11 HAM 20 MML 44 MDM 57 
9 RAM 11 SAM 17 NDS 41 EBW 56 
10 ESM 10 ASS 15 EBW 34 MML 48 
11 HAM 8 NDS 13 LCN 33 SAM 43 
12 NDS 8 RAM 12 ESM 26 NDS 43 
13 PBC 8 EBW 11 SAM 25 WAC 39 
14 WAC 5 ESM 11 RAM 24 PTR 29 
15 IRM 5 PBC 9 PTR 24 IRM 28 
16 SAT 5 SSP 8 WAC 23 ESM 26 
17 EBW 4 SAT 7 SAT 20 RAM 24 
18 SSP 4 CM 6 PBC 19 SAT 23 
19 PTR 3 WAC 5 CM 17 PBC 19 
20 VM 2 IRM 5 IRM 16 CM 17 
21 CM 1 PTR 3 VM 11 VM 14 
22 MML 1 VM 2 SSP 10 SSP 10 
 
 Figure 27: CSCD High-Risk Parent Control Family landscape based on RMM Level 
5.11. DIVERSITY OF SOPHISTICATION LEVEL ON RMM LEVEL ENTERPRISE 
We have defined CSCD sophistication level for effective implementation and practice of subcontrols. 
After gathering all data from our research, we have observed interesting results of changing 
sophistication levels for different RMM level institutions. At first, we sort down specified control 
family then calculate the percentage of each sophistication level. In the following illustration, we 
have seen the majority of sub controls (58%) are basic, 28% are Industry standard, and 14% sub 
controls are state of the art sophistication type for micro to small enterprises. 
  




Figure 30: Sophistication level on Medium to large, Figure 31: Sophistication level on Large to Super 
Large  
On the other hand, we have seen drastic changes in the sophistication level for small to medium level 
enterprises. Here 43% of controls require industry-standard implementation and support. 
Nevertheless, 39% of controls defined state-of-the-art sophistication level. These data give clear 
indication that small to medium level companies require more skillful resources to implement and 
manage CSCD controls. If we look on to medium to large and large to medium level organizations, it 
is clearly visible that the majority of controls are industry-standard, whereas 43% is the highest in D 
Level institutes among other RMM levels.  An interesting fact is that the small to medium level 






In this section, it is important to acknowledge and mention that the objectives that were set prior to 
start research have been achieved by this work. Information collected from a large number of 
scientific papers and frameworks makes it possible to prepare a comprehensive result. There is no 
doubt that cybersecurity is a great matter of concern for every type of organization. By this research 
will contribute to define in the cybersecurity and cyber defense strategy for better planning to 
safeguard specific enterprises to maintain cyber resilience.  
6.1  SYNTHESIS OF THE RESEARCH 
Getting a solid idea about CSCD controls is important for the overall organization. This author (Byres 
& Hoffman, 2004) recommends some points to focus on about cybersecurity risks. In the paper 
author emphasis, it is first understanding the vulnerability and the approaches to secure the system. 
Besides, a strong recommendation was given about preparing a security policy for the IT asset. On 
the other hand author (Schaffner, 2019) clearly described the control criteria and category of 
cybersecurity. The author also suggests identifying and assess changes that significantly impact the 
system of internal control. Moreover, we get a clear understanding from that same research paper 
about the contribution of implementing and measuring control impact. 
Regarding adopting a Critical and Proactive Posture on CSCD Standards, the author gives high  
importance on it and also narrated that there is not any universal standard to rely on for 
organizational CSCD (Piètre-Cambacédes et al., 2011). In addition, we also get an idea about 
adaptability and getting leverage from the existing framework. Therefore, enterprises need to 
identify critical CSCD control by control risk assessment in order to safeguard IT asset. After analysing 
(HM Government, 2020) Cybersecurity strategy, it is very clear that cyber threats are increasing more 
to large enterprises.  
In order to provide secure and compliant access to IT resources, centralized identity and access 
management (IAM) have become one of the main challenges for companies (Kunz et al., 2019). 
Literature from this paper (Kruger & Mama, 2012), illustrated how important are identity 
management implementation and its impact to the organization's structures, policies, practices and 
technology platforms. According to (Fuchs & Pernul, 2007)it specifically issues such as risk 
management, governance, and compliance that require IdM attention within information security 
management. (Technology et al., 1999) contends that IdM addresses more than just security issues, 
providing business value through auditing, compliance, and monitoring. 
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The stationary nature of traditional intrusion detection systems makes them vulnerable to network 
instability as well as the attacks they seek to detect (Frincke & Wilhite, 2001). When considering 
network security, it must be emphasized that the whole network is secure (Bhavya Daya, 2013) . 
Network security does not only concern the security in the computers at each end of the 
communication chain, rather Securing the network is just as important as securing the computers 
and encrypting the message becasue a possible hacker can target communication chanel ,obtain data 
and decript it (Bhavya Daya, 2013). In a computer network basically, there are two types of attack 
can happen. When a network intruder intercepts data traveling through the network is known as 
passive network attack and when an intruder initiates commands to disrupt the network's normal 
operation is identified as an active attack (Pawar & Anuradha, 2015). Therefore, it makes very clear 
that if any network is compromised, then the impact on the company and business can be massive. 
That is why Network defense is considered as one of the top control for CSCD. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE WORK 
It has always been crucial to identifying the limitation of work when it is based on scientific research, 
including with cross information technology domain aspect. Cybersecurity and cyber defense are vast 
fields of study. The diversity of the technology is really vast in CSCD field. Vital part of this research is 
to understand about the different CSCD control families from different frameworks. As because of 
the diverse knowledge included, understanding about the different control was the most time-
consuming part of the research. In order to identify the top CSCD control family, we had to analyze 
large number of controls. The different framework has a different way of representation of control. 
Among of them to categorized all controls in a common criteria was the most difficult part. Another 
important thing is that we considered only renowned framework control for data reliability. In out 
data sampling of CSCD controls, there would be some widely used controls missing or not considered 
because of difficulties putting in the same categorization, specify outcome and evaluate or 
understand of control’s impact on RMM level enterprises.  
As the research is conducted based upon survey, observation, and analysis of different frameworks, 
the accuracy and quality of research can be higher if more time and range of the scientific paper or 
framework could increase. Likewise, criteria definition can be more improved. Based on other 
frameworks or scientific paper analyses, the possible improvement criteria have been defined for risk 
scoring for control unavailability. As because there is a lack of a well-defined method for defining 
CSCD control risk scoring, we had to consider and use usually Cybersecurity risk assessment in our 
research and measuring risk for not active controls.  
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6.3 NEXT STEPS AND FUTURE WORK 
Next step and future work will be done based on the limitation mentioned above. At first, we need to 
focus on the CSCD control data quality and clarity. Without having quality data it would not be 
possible to get an accurate result. Understanding each control’s absence risk is very important for 
the enterprises. As because each control implementation requires IT capability, budget and planning, 
a well-defined strategy can help enterprises to ensure cyber resilience to implement these. 
Moreover, understanding the sophistication level of controls are important, although according to 
the different level, organizations may have different expertise and complexity on sophistication. 
More data and information about control implementation can be collected to make more accuracy of 
control sophistication on RMM level enterprises.  
In the same way, sector-wise, to some extend, different control implementation might have different 
challenges.  Even the control absence risk varies to different levels of companies. Defining and 
implementing strategy will be easier if the idea about control absence risk is determined more 
accurately of the specific organizational level. To do so in the future, more accurate data can be 
collected about sector-wise control absence risk.  A survey can be conducted to RMM level 
companies together with actual data.   
In recent years, cyber threats and ways of attacks have been changed dramatically. With the 
advancement of technologies, IT systems are driven by disruptive technologies that are same under 
massive threat as conventional information systems. IoT, blockchane, AI, space colonization, bio-
medical innovation, 3d printing, robotics, virual & augmented reality, and quantum computing are 
the latest field of disruption technologies. These days we have seen the uses of such technologies 
more widely than past. That is why explore more in disruptive technologies security in terms of CSCD 
context will be a great scope of future work. In this area, CSCD controls are not get matured enough 
as the technology is still in growth. Different technological knowledge can be gained by Identifying 
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We have conducted a risk analysis based on the gathered data. We have used Microsoft Excel to 
collect, analyze and model the data for the result. Detail analyses and data are given below in the 
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